Boston University School of Law

Scholarly Commons at Boston University School of Law
Faculty Scholarship
5-2016

Sufficiently Safeguarded?: Competency Evaluations of Mentally Ill
Respondents in Removal Proceedings
Sarah R. Sherman-Stokes
Boston University School of Law

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.bu.edu/faculty_scholarship
Part of the Disability Law Commons, and the Immigration Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Sarah R. Sherman-Stokes, Sufficiently Safeguarded?: Competency Evaluations of Mentally Ill Respondents
in Removal Proceedings , in 67 Hastings Law Journal 1023 (2016).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.bu.edu/faculty_scholarship/354

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by
Scholarly Commons at Boston University School of Law.
It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship
by an authorized administrator of Scholarly Commons at
Boston University School of Law. For more information,
please contact lawlessa@bu.edu.

SUFFICIENTLY SAFEGUARDED?:
COMPETENCY EVALUATIONS OF MENTAL
ILL RESPONDENTS IN REMOVAL
PROCEEDINGS
Boston University School of Law
Public Law & Legal Theory Paper No. 16-17
67 Hastings L.J. 1023
May 13, 2016

Sarah Sherman-Stokes
Boston University School of Law

This paper can be downloaded without charge at:
http://www.bu.edu/law/faculty-scholarship/working-paper-series/

Sherman-Stokes_19 (Dukanovic).DOC (Do Not Delete)

5/10/2016 4:22 PM

Sufficiently Safeguarded?:
Competency Evaluations of Mentally Ill
Respondents in Removal Proceedings
Sarah Sherman-Stokes*
In this Article, I examine the current regime for making mental competency
determinations of mentally ill and incompetent noncitizen respondents in immigration
court. In its present iteration, mental competency determinations in immigration court
are made by immigration judges, most commonly without the benefit of any mental
health evaluation or expertise. In reflecting on the protections and processes in place in
the criminal justice system, and on interviews with removal defense practitioners at ten
different sites across the United States, I conclude that the role of the immigration judge
in mental competency determinations must be changed in order to protect the
fundamental fairness of the proceeding. Specifically, I propose a central role for mental
health professionals, whose expertise, evaluation, and testimony can inform the court
and lead to a more thorough and fair decisionmaking process.

* Sarah Sherman-Stokes, Clinical Teaching Fellow, Boston University School of Law,
Immigrants’ Rights Clinic. J.D. Boston College Law School. I want to thank participants at the
Emerging Immigration Scholars’ Conference (2015) and the NYU School of Law Clinical Law Review
Writers’ Workshop (2015), including Jason Cade, César Cuauhtémoc García Hernández, Ernie
Collette, Lindsay Harris, Geoffrey Heeren, Laila Hlass, Liz Keyes, Christopher Lasch, Peter
Markowitz, Mark Noferi, and Claire Thomas who provided valuable input on an early version of this
Article. I also want to thank Mary Holper, Daniel Kanstroom, Wendy Kaplan, Jennifer Klein, Katie
Tinto, and Emma Winger for their thoughtful feedback on this Article as it evolved. Thank you also to
Corrylee Drozda for her helpful research assistance. Finally, thank you to the immigration
practitioners and immigration judges who shared their experiences, and those of their clients and the
respondents who appeared before them, respectively.
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Introduction
1

Jonathan immigrated to the United States from Latin America at
six years old with his mother, his father, and his younger sister, all of
them lawful permanent residents. Beginning when he was just eight years
old and continuing for the next ten years, Jonathan moved between
psychiatric hospitals, inpatient programs, treatment centers, and special
schools. A parade of diagnoses followed him—mild mental retardation,
learning disabilities, speech and language processing disorders, ADHD,
bipolar disorder, conduct disorder, and psychosis not otherwise specified.
He was suicidal from a young age and suffered threatening visual and
auditory hallucinations. He could not read or write and seemed unable to
grasp basic concepts. After selling twenty dollars’ worth of crack cocaine
to an undercover police officer when he was eighteen years old, Jonathan
was arrested. He was housed in the mental health unit of a large city jail
and although a competency evaluation was recommended, it was not
completed. After several months in criminal custody, Jonathan pled
guilty to criminal sale of a controlled substance. Approximately six years
later, Jonathan was arrested by Immigration and Customs Enforcement
(“ICE”). On the basis of his conviction as a teenager, Jonathan was
2
charged with having been convicted of an “aggravated felony” —drug
trafficking—and he was placed in removal proceedings by the
Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”).
Jonathan was held in a remote detention center in New England,
3
where he was kept in solitary confinement for weeks. Jonathan was, by
turns, gregarious—smiling widely and eager to play tic-tac-toe—and
4
emotional—crying easily and liable to storm off mid-conversation. Not
only had Jonathan always believed that he was a U.S. citizen, but he
could not understand the connection between his criminal conviction and
his potential exile from his family in the United States. Still unable to
read or write more than his own name, Jonathan did not understand the
charges against him or the high stakes involved. He could not afford to
hire an attorney and none was appointed for him. In initial court
appearances, in which he was unrepresented, Jonathan could be heard

1. “Jonathan” is a pseudonym for one of the Author’s former clients. Identifying details have
been changed slightly to protect his identity.
2. Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-236, § 101(a)(43)(B) (codified
at 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)).
3. ICE’s reliance on solitary confinement for the mentally ill and incompetent is widespread. In
2013, about 300 immigrants were held in solitary confinement at the fifty largest detention centers
across the United States. Ian Urbina & Catherine Rentz, Immigrants Held in Solitary Cells, Often for
Weeks, N.Y. Times, Mar. 24, 2013, at A1. Nearly half of these detainees “are isolated for 15 days or
more, the point at which psychiatric experts say they are at risk for severe mental harm.” Id.
4. The detrimental impact of incarceration on the mentally ill has been well documented. See,
e.g., Lorna Collier, Incarceration Nation, 45 Am. Psychol. Ass’n 56 (2014) (noting “decreased
psychological well-being and increased risk of suicide” of inmates).
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crying, yelling at the judge or, during one encounter, getting up and
leaving as the judge pleaded with him to return. Although Jonathan was
prescribed psychiatric medication by the jail where he was held, DHS
was not required to—and did not—share any of this information with the
5
immigration judge, despite the immigration judge’s requests. Nor did
Jonathan volunteer this information. In fact, without counsel, Jonathan
was unable to provide medical records, or any evidence of a diagnosed
medical or mental health condition or disability. Jonathan was also
unable to secure a psychological evaluation and neither DHS nor the
immigration judge requested one. The Immigration Judge did not find
Jonathan to be incompetent despite his profound inability to
communicate with the immigration judge and his regular in-court
outbursts. In short, in the absence of any consultation with or evaluation
by a mental health professional—and without access to medical or
mental health records—a determination was made that Jonathan was not
only competent to proceed in his removal proceedings, but that he was
6
competent to do so, pro se.
Among the nearly 34,000 persons detained by ICE on any given day
across the United States, confidential memorandums estimate that at
least fifteen percent are, like Jonathan, believed to have a mental
7
disorder. In Fiscal Year (“FY”) 2012, ICE recorded 54,969 mental
8
health interventions in ICE custody. Despite this crisis, and recent case
law, growing advocacy and litigation, and some action on the part of the
Executive Office for Immigration Review (“EOIR”), protections for
9
mentally ill and incompetent respondents remain inadequate. While the

5. Recent guidance from the Executive Office for Immigration Review notes that, “[i]deally, in a
detained setting, DHS counsel will alert the Immigration Judge to any mental health issues discovered
upon intake or based on information contained in the Department’s file.” Immigration Judge
Benchbook, U.S. Dep’t of Just. (2015), http://www.justice.gov/eoir/immigration-judge-benchbookmental-health-issues. This guidance goes on to suggest that should DHS refuse to share this
information, the immigration judge may order DHS to do so. Id.
6. Ultimately, my colleagues and I represented Jonathan in removal proceedings where,
following a competency evaluation and competency hearing, a finding of incompetence and the
imposition of certain procedural safeguards, Jonathan was granted relief from removal and released
from detention. At the time that I represented Jonathan, I was an Equal Justice Works Fellow at the
Political Asylum/Immigration Representation (“PAIR”) Project, the premier provider of pro bono
immigration legal services to asylum-seekers and detained noncitizens in Massachusetts. At the PAIR
Project, the focus of my work was on the representation of detained, mentally ill noncitizens in
removal proceedings and Jonathan was just one of many like him that I encountered, advised, or
represented during my two-year fellowship.
7. Alonso Yáñez, Living in the Shadows: Detention Centers Deaths Raise Immigrant Rights
Questions, New Am. Media (Feb. 19, 2014), http://newamericamedia.org/2014/02/living-in-the-shadowsdetention-centers-deaths-raise-immigrant-rights-questions.php.
8. Detainee Health Care—FY2012, U.S. Customs & Immigr. Enf’t, http://www.ice.gov/factsheets/
dhc-fy12 (last visited Apr. 8, 2016).
9. “Respondent” is the title given to a defendant in removal proceedings. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 101(r),
1001.1(r) (2016) (“The term respondent means a person named in a Notice to Appear issued in

Sherman-Stokes_19 (Dukanovic).DOC (Do Not Delete)

May 2016]

SUFFICIENTLY SAFEGUARDED?

5/10/2016 4:22 PM

1027

existing body of scholarship on this topic is strong, it is small, specifically
as regards the process for competency evaluation and determination of
mentally ill and incompetent respondents. This Article argues that the
current system of competency determinations in removal proceedings—
where such initial determinations are the exclusive province of an
immigration judge—provide an inadequate protection that violates
fundamental fairness. In light of comparisons to the protections and
processes in place in the criminal justice system and in consideration of
interviews with immigration practitioners at ten different sites across the
country, this Article argues that the role of the immigration judge must
be largely removed from the competency evaluation process and replaced
by the evaluation and opinion of a certified and licensed mental health
professional.
The treatment of incompetency in the criminal context makes for a
worthwhile comparison to immigration removal proceedings, not least
10
because both are decidedly adversarial proceedings. As the Board of
Immigration Appeals (“BIA” or “Board”) stated in In re M-A-M-, “the
law regarding mental competency issues in criminal proceedings is well
11
developed, and we consider it instructive.” Other scholars have argued for
myriad additional protections for mentally ill and incompetent respondents,
12
including a substantive right to competence in removal proceedings;
13
appointed counsel for the mentally ill and incompetent; and the provision
of court appointed guardian ad litem for mentally ill respondents appearing
14
pro se. However, the role of mental health professionals in competency
determinations has not yet been examined. This Article argues that mental
health professionals must play a paramount role and further explains why
other alternative fixes are insufficient to adequately protect the rights of
mentally ill and incompetent noncitizens.

accordance with section 239(a) of the Act, or in an Order to Show Cause issued in accordance with
§ 242.1 of 8 CFR chapter I as it existed prior to April 1, 1997.”).
10. Because it is most analogous to the immigration removal process, this Article contends with
the competency standard to stand trial in a criminal proceeding. But it is worth noting that there are
certainly other standards related to mental health and competency at play in criminal proceedings. See,
e.g., Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 402 (1993) (holding right to plead guilty requires same level of
competence as that articulated in Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402 (1960)); Ford v. Wainwright, 477
U.S. 399, 404–05 (1986) (regarding competence required for execution).
11. In re M-A-M-, 25 I. & N. Dec. 474, 478 (B.I.A. 2011).
12. Fatma E. Marouf, Incompetent but Deportable: The Case for a Right to Mental Competence in
Removal Proceedings, 65 Hastings L.J. 929, 967–69 (2014).
13. See, e.g., Alice Clapman, Hearing Difficult Voices: The Due-Process Rights of Mentally
Disabled Individuals in Removal Proceedings, 45 New Eng. L. Rev. 373, 373 (2011); Amelia Wilson &
Natalie H. Prokop, Applying Method to the Madness: The Right to Court Appointed Guardians Ad
Litem and Counsel for the Mentally Ill in Immigration Proceedings, 16 U. Pa. J.L. & Soc. Change 1, 2–
3 (2013).
14. See Wilson & Prokop, supra note 13.
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The context in which mentally ill and mentally incompetent
respondents face deportation from the United States is a bleak one. Persons
in removal proceedings with mental illness, developmental delays, and
other cognitive and mental disabilities are detained for long periods of
time with few rights available to them. Indeed, in a shift that has further
disadvantaged mentally ill and mentally incompetent respondents,
detention and deportation have grown significantly since the 1980s and
15
under the Obama administration, more than two million persons have
been removed from the United States. Among those detained and deported
are a growing number of mentally ill and mentally incompetent persons.
Recent studies estimate the prevalence of mental illness in adults in the
16
United States to be anywhere between 18.5% and 32.4%. Mental health
experts have noted that the percentage of mental health problems are
even greater among immigrants and refugees, who are unique in the
17
risks, stressors, and traumas they suffer. Meanwhile, nearly two-thirds
18
of jail inmates satisfy the criteria for a mental health problem. This all
adds up to a significant crisis for detained, mentally ill, and incompetent
respondents.
Though immigration detention and deportation proceedings have
19
historically been considered “civil,” ICE detention for the mentally ill
and incompetent looks a lot like criminal custody in jails and
prisonsIndeed, it is in jails, prisons, and privately run detention centers that
20
resemble correctional settings, where noncitizens are detained. In 1952,
with the passage of the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”),
15. Although I will use the term “noncitizens” throughout this Article, it is worth mentioning that
U.S. citizens have routinely, and unlawfully, been detained in, and deported from, the United States.
See, e.g., Jacqueline Stevens, U.S. Government Unlawfully Detaining and Deporting U.S. Citizens as
Aliens, 18 Va. J. Soc. Pol’y & L. 606, 630 (2011) (finding that since 2003, more than 20,000 U.S. citizens
have been detained or deported from the United States).
16. Erin Bagalman & Angela Napili, Cong. Research Serv., Prevalence of Mental Illness
in the United States: Data Sources and Estimates (2015).
17. See, e.g., Andrés J. Pumariega et al., Mental Health of Immigrants and Refugees,
41 Community Mental Health J. 581, 584–85 (2005).
18. See, e.g., Inmate Mental Health, Nat’l Inst. of Mental Health, http://www.nimh.nih.gov/
health/statistics/prevalence/inmate-mental-health.shtml.
19. See, e.g., Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 594 (1952) (“Deportation, however severe
its consequences, has been consistently classified as a civil rather than a criminal procedure.”).
20. Dora Schriro, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Immigration Detention Overview and
Recommendations 4 (2009) (“As a matter of law, Immigration Detention is unlike Criminal
Incarceration. Yet Immigration Detention and Criminal Incarceration detainees tend to be seen by the
public as comparable, and both confined populations are typically managed in similar ways. Each
group is ordinarily detained in secure facilities with hardened perimeters in remote locations at
considerable distances from counsel and/or their communities. With only a few exceptions, the
facilities that ICE uses to detain aliens were originally built, and currently operate, as jails and prisons
to confine pre-trial and sentenced felons. Their design, construction, staffing plans, and population
management strategies are based largely upon the principles of command and control. Likewise, ICE
adopted standards that are based upon corrections law and promulgated by correctional organizations
to guide the operation of jails and prisons.”).
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detention was largely eliminated except in cases where the noncitizen
posed a flight risk or serious risk to the community. But since the 1980s,
21
detention and deportation have exploded. Feeding this deportation
machine has been the rise of extended border control, increased expedited
22
removal, and expanded mandatory detention. These are just some of
the results of two laws passed in 1996: the Antiterrorism and Effective
Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”) and the Illegal Immigration Reform and
23
Immigrant Responsibility Act (“IIRIRA”). The impact has been
24
simultaneously devastating to immigrant families and a boon to
25
enforcement and private corporations. In 1995, there were 6785
26
immigrants detained in detention centers nationwide. Over the next two
27
decades, the number grew, more than quadrupling to 34,000 as of 2013.
A congressional “bed mandate” has kept this number steady—requiring,
“[ICE] to keep an average of 34,000 detainees per day in its custody,” a
28
number that has risen, almost relentlessly, since 2006.
The mentally ill and incompetent in immigration detention are often
first funneled through the criminal justice system. Indeed, collaboration,
whether intentional or simply consequential, between the criminal justice
system and immigration detention and removal proceedings is well

21. See Daniel Kanstroom, Deportation Nation: Outsiders in American History 228–30
(2007).
22. See id. (discussing increased apprehensions by Customs and Border Patrol along the U.S.Mexico border, the expansion of expedited removal to within 100 miles of U.S. land borders, north
and south, and 1996 immigration laws that subjected more and more noncitizens to rigid rules of
mandatory detention).
23. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Control Act (ADEPA) of 1996, Pub. L. 104-132,
110 Stat. 1214 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8, 18, 22, 28, 40, 42 U.S.C.); Illegal
Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110
Stat. 3009-546 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8, 18 U.S.C.).
24. See, e.g., Kalina Brabeck & Qingwen Xu, The Impact of Detention and Deportation on Latino
Immigrant Children and Families: A Quantitative Exploration, 32 Hisp. J. Behav. Sci. 34 (2010) (using
regression analyses to show the emotional and social impact of detention, deportation, and
vulnerability of parents’ legal status on the growth and development of children); see also Joanna
Dreby, The Burden of Deportation on Children in Mexican Immigrant Families, 74 J. Marriage & Fam.
829 (2012) (describing study findings showing that children in Mexican immigrant households describe
fear about their family stability and confusion over the impact legality has on their lives, and as a result
suffer significant emotional distress).
25. See, e.g., ACLU, Warehoused and Forgotten: Immigrants Trapped in Our Shadow
Private Prison System, 17 (2014); Suevon Lee, By the Numbers: The Growing For-Profit Detention
Industry, MotherJones (June 21, 2012, 6:00 AM), http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2012/
06/prison-profit-industry-corporation-money-jail (discussing the growing billion dollar for-profit
detention industry).
26. Yáñez, supra note 7.
27. Id.
28. Nick Miroff, Controversial Quota Drives Immigration Detention Boom, Wash. Post (Oct. 13, 2013),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/controversial-quota-drives-immigration-detention-boom/2013/10/
13/09bb689e-214c-11e3-ad1a-1a919f2ed890_story.html.
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29

documented and longstanding. The interconnectedness between the
immigration removal system and the criminal justice system is present at
nearly every stage of the process—from initial apprehension and arrest,
to detention and interrogation by immigration officials of defendants in
30
criminal custody and while on probation and parole.
The increasing parallels between the criminal justice and immigration
removal systems are significant, but stop short of concurrent enhanced
procedural protections for noncitizen respondents in removal proceedings.
Indeed, today respondents face an immigration removal system that is
imbued with the “theories, methods, perceptions, and priorities associated
with criminal enforcement while explicitly rejecting the procedural
31
ingredients of criminal adjudication.” Over the last several years in
particular, even the Supreme Court has begun to give way in their
historic classification of immigration removal as “civil,” acknowledging
32
both that deportation is “intimately related to the criminal process” and
33
the “harsh consequences” of a removal order. In fact, various criminal
trial procedures and procedural safeguards have gradually been applied
in immigration proceedings. Some of these include principles against

29. See, e.g., Jennifer M. Chacón, Managing Migration Through Crime, 109 Colum. L. Rev. 135
(2009); César Cuauhtémoc García Hernández, Creating Crimmigration, 2013 BYU L. Rev. 1457;
Daniel Kanstroom, Criminalizing the Undocumented: Ironic Boundaries of the Post-September 11th
“Pale of Law,” 29 N.C. J. Int’l L. & Com. Reg. 639 (2004); Hiroshi Motomura, The Discretion That
Matters: Federal Immigration Enforcement, State and Local Arrests, and the Civil-Criminal Line, 58
UCLA L. Rev. 1819 (2011); Juliet Stumpf, The Crimmigration Crisis: Immigrants, Crime, and
Sovereign Power, 56 Am. U. L. Rev. 367 (2006).
30. See, e.g., Chacón, supra note 29 (exploring criminal prosecution of migration related
offenses); Kanstroom, supra note 29, at 640 (examining the “convergence between the immigration
and criminal justice systems”); Stephen H. Legomsky, The New Path of Immigration Law: Asymmetric
Incorporation of Criminal Justice Norms, 64 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 469, 471–72 (2007) (describing
“growing convergence” of criminal justice and immigration law); Teresa A. Miller, Blurring the
Boundaries Between Immigration and Crime Control After September 11th, 25 B.C. Third World L.J.
81, 83–86 (2005) (describing consequences of increasing interaction between fields of criminal justice
and immigration law); Teresa A. Miller, Citizenship and Severity: Recent Immigration Reforms and the
New Penology, 17 Geo. Immigr. L.J. 611, 616–20 (2003) (describing criminalization of immigration
law); Stumpf, supra note 29, at 367–77 (noting “intense interest” in “crimmigration law”).
31. Legomsky, supra note 30, at 469; see also Bill Ong Hing, Providing a Second Chance,
39 Conn. L. Rev. 1893, 1902 (2007) (arguing that deportation is not only “double punishment” but that
removal is the “most final and permanent punishment an individual can face”); Robert Pauw, A New
Look at Deportation as Punishment: Why at Least Some of the Constitution’s Criminal Procedure
Protections Must Apply, 52 Admin. L. Rev. 305, 339–40 (2000) (arguing that deportation is punishment
and therefore respondents should be guaranteed a right to counsel and the government should be
limited by the ex post facto clause and the ban on cruel and unusual punishment in carrying out its
deportation power).
32. Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 357 (2010); see also Daniel Kanstroom, The Right to
Deportation Counsel in Padilla v. Kentucky: The Challenging Construction of the Fifth-and-a-Half
Amendment, 58 UCLA L. Rev. 1461 (2011) (positing that Padilla opens the door for construction of a
“Fifth-and-a-Half” Amendment that embodies both the flexible due process guarantees of the Fifth
Amendment and the more specific protections of the Sixth Amendment).
33. Padilla, 559 U.S. at 360.
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retroactivity, analysis under the “void for vagueness” doctrine, the rule
36
37
of lenity, and the exclusionary rule. In addition, some scholars have
38
suggested implementing quasi-criminal procedural safeguards.
Mentally ill and incompetent respondents are further disadvantaged
in immigration removal proceedings because immigration law is
39
famously complex. Circuit courts have not been shy in articulating the
difficulty that even judges have in understanding and applying the INA,
noting poetically that “morsels of comprehension must be pried from
40
mollusks of jargon” and that the INA constitutes a kind of “never-never
41
land” where even “plain words do not always mean what they say.”
Against this backdrop of inscrutable law is an adversarial proceeding that
is heavily imbalanced. Opposite the respondent is opposing counsel,
represented by the DHS—trained immigration attorneys with a bevy of
42
state and federal resources at their disposal. Even when not accounting
for mental illness, when respondents are not represented by counsel, this
imbalance creates an asymmetry with devastating consequences. Indeed,
one study found that of those respondents seeking asylum in removal
43
proceedings, a meager 16.3% are successful without counsel. By
comparison, the same study found that 45.6% of those asylum seekers who
44
are represented by counsel are granted asylum. Add to this calculus an
unrepresented respondent who is suffering from mental illness and/or
mental incompetency, and what began an imbalance suddenly feels like an
avalanche.
It is in this context of a “civil” system that feels and, is increasingly
acknowledged to be, criminal, and at a time in this system where the

34. See Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 324 (2001).
35. Jordan v. De George, 341 U.S. 223, 231 (1951).
36. See Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1, 11 n.8 (2004); Fong Haw Tan v. Phelan, 333 U.S. 6, 10
(1948).
37. See Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1050–51 (1984)
(applying the exclusionary rule, although only where there has been an “egregious” violation).
38. See, e.g., Mary Holper, Confronting Cops in Immigration Court, 23 Wm. & Mary Bill Rts. J.
675, 677 (2015) (arguing that immigration judges should not admit police reports into evidence against
a noncitizen unless the police officers are subject to cross-examination).
39. Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 377 (2010) (Alito, J., concurring) (explaining that, for
example, “providing advice on whether a conviction for a particular offense will make an alien
removable is often quite complex”).
40. See Kwon v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 646 F.2d 909, 919 (5th Cir. 1981)
(“Whatever guidance the regulations furnish to those cognoscenti familiar with INS procedures, this
court, despite many years of legal experience, finds that they yield up meaning only grudgingly and
that morsels of comprehension must be pried from mollusks of jargon.”).
41. Yuen Sang Low v. Att’y Gen. of U.S., 479 F.2d 820, 821 (9th Cir. 1973).
42. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Budget-in-Brief: Fiscal Year 2015, at 10 (2015) (showing budget
request of $38.2 billion for DHS for FY 2015).
43. Jaya Ramji-Nogales et al., Refugee Roulette: Disparities in Asylum Adjudication, 60 Stan. L.
Rev. 295, 340 (2007).
44. See id.
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rights and protections afforded to noncitizen respondents are particularly
dynamic that this Article recommends that a mental health professional
should play a paramount role in competency determinations for mentally
ill respondents. This Article argues that the competency determination
undertaken in immigration removal proceedings should be more akin to
that in criminal proceedings, especially in light of the growing symmetry
between them. Like immigration removal proceedings, criminal court
proceedings are complex and adversarial. In this setting—where the
stakes are high—we would not ask a criminal court judge to alone arrive at
a competency determination; neither can we ask that of an immigration
judge.
Part I of this Article begins by laying out the substantive criminal
law and procedure around competency determinations in criminal court.
Specifically, this Part discusses the landmark cases of Dusky, Drope, and
Edwards, and the competency standard set out in contemporary criminal
justice proceedings, including the role of both the criminal judge and
mental health professionals in these proceedings. Part II outlines the
current legal framework, legal protections, and landscape for mentally ill
and mentally incompetent respondents in immigration removal proceedings.
As well as detailing recent developments in the law, this Part examines the
historic roots of protections for mentally ill and mentally incompetent
respondents and how case law has added some—but not enough—weight
to the statutes and regulations currently governing this area of law.
Specifically, this Article breaks down the analysis laid out in the Board’s
decision in In re M-A-M- and subsequently successful litigation in
Franco-Gonzalez.
Part II concludes with a discussion of recent interviews with
immigration defense practitioners at ten different sites across the country.
These interviews illuminate not only that the current protections offered
to incompetent respondents are insufficient but, more troubling, that
disproportionate weight is given to the determination of an immigration
judge rather than that of a mental health professional.
Part III of this Article contends that the role of immigration judges
in competency determinations must be deemphasized in favor of an
evaluation by a mental health professional as soon as questions regarding
competency arise. This is especially true in consideration of the rights
and protections afforded to criminal defendants, the on-the-ground
realities of respondents in removal proceedings, and the guarantee of
fundamental fairness. This Part then grapples with possible alternatives
to this recommendation, explains why they are insufficient, and makes
suggestions for how to avoid the possible pitfalls of relying on expert
testimony by mental health professionals as determinative.
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I. Competency Proceedings, Rights, and Protections in
Criminal Law
Since 1949, the U.S. Code has included considerations for the
45
evaluation and treatment of mentally ill defendants in criminal court.
Today, convicting an incompetent criminal defendant or failing to
provide a legally adequate competency determination can amount to a
46
violation of a criminal defendant’s constitutional rights. The right to be
competent in order to stand trial has also been held to go to the integrity
47
of the criminal justice system. In reaching this point, the criminal courts
have benefitted from more than sixty years of jurisprudence and
48
scholarship, wrestling all the while with how—and to what extent—the
rights of mentally ill and incompetent defendants should be protected
where liberty is on the line.
A. The Competency Standard for Defendants in Criminal Court
In 1954, in the criminal case Massey v. Moore, the Supreme Court
held that “[n]o trial can be fair that leaves the defense to a man who is
insane, unaided by counsel, and who by reason of his mental condition
49
stands helpless and alone before the court.” This initial inclination to
protect the rights of incompetent criminal defendants was made more
robust with the Supreme Court’s decision in Dusky just six years later.
There, the Court decided what standard should be applied to criminal
50
defendants who may lack competence to proceed. The defendant in that
case, Milton R. Dusky, was charged with kidnapping and transporting a
51
girl across state lines. Mr. Dusky entered a plea of not guilty, but at the
suggestion of his defense counsel that his mental competency to stand
trial might be in doubt, Mr. Dusky was immediately sent for evaluation
52
by a mental health professional. Court appointed psychiatrists
subsequently found that the defendant suffered from schizophrenia and,
though oriented to time and place, was unable to understand the nature
45. 18 U.S.C. § 4244 (2016).
46. See Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 178–82 (1975).
47. See Youtsey v. United States, 97 F. 937, 947 (6th Cir. 1899) (reversing trial court judgment
and ordering new trial to require “a thorough investigation of the sanity of the accused”).
48. See, e.g., Richard J. Bonnie, The Competence of Criminal Defendants: Beyond Dusky and
Drope, 47 U. Miami L. Rev. 539, 549–60 (1993); Ronald Roesch et al., Conceptualizing and Assessing
Competency to Stand Trial: Implications and Applications of the MacArthur Treatment Competence
Model, 2 Psychol. Pub. Pol’y & L. 96, 101–02 (1996) (arguing that competency fits best in context
rather than being understood as one unilateral concept). See generally Louis B. Schlesinger, A Case
Study Involving Competency to Stand Trial: Incompetent Defendant, Incompetent Examiner, or
“Malingering by Proxy”?, 9 Psychol. Pub. Pol’y & L. 381 (2003) (providing case study of forensic
evaluation involving competency to stand trial).
49. Massey v. Moore, 348 U.S. 105, 108 (1954).
50. Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402 (1960).
51. Dusky v. United States, 271 F.2d 385, 387 (8th Cir. 1959).
52. Id.
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53

of the proceedings against him. Despite this, the trial court found the
54
defendant competent and the Eighth Circuit affirmed.
Reversing that holding, the Supreme Court set forth a two-part test
55
to determine whether a criminal defendant is competent to stand trial.
First, the defendant must have the sufficient present ability to consult
56
with her lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding.
Second, she must have a rational as well as a factual understanding of the
57
proceeding against her. The Court made clear that being “oriented to
time and place” and having “some recollection of events” was insufficient
58
if the defendant did not also satisfy this two-part test. Further decisions
have elaborated on Dusky, explaining that not only is orientation to time
and place insufficient, but also that a defendant’s demeanor during the
proceedings on the record should not allow the court to ignore the
defendant’s history of irrational behavior—which is extremely relevant
59
to competency determinations.
60
In Drope v. Missouri, the Supreme Court added to the Dusky
analysis. The defendant in Drope was indicted for raping his wife and on
61
the second day of trial, attempted to commit suicide. The trial
proceeded in his absence on the premise that his absence was
62
“voluntary.” The defendant was found guilty, his motion for a new trial
was denied, and his guilt was later upheld by the Missouri Supreme
Court. The defendant then filed a motion to vacate his conviction and
sentence, arguing that the failure of the court to order a pretrial
63
psychiatric evaluation violated his constitutional rights. The Missouri
Supreme Court denied this motion and the Appeals Court affirmed,
holding that the evidence provided “did not create a reasonable doubt of
his competence as a matter of law, that [he] had failed to demonstrate
64
the inadequacy of the procedures employed for protecting his rights.”
The defendant appealed to the Supreme Court, which reversed and
remanded in a unanimous decision. Relevant to the discussion in this
Article, the Supreme Court held that the Missouri courts failed to give
proper weight to the evidence suggesting that the defendant was
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. See Dusky, 362 U.S. at 402.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. See Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 385–86 (1966) (finding although demeanor at trial was
relevant, it could not be relied upon to dispense with a competency hearing). The Court also noted
that evidence of defendant’s history of irrational behavior required further inquiry. Id. at 385.
60. Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162 (1975).
61. Id. at 169.
62. Id. at 168.
63. Id. at 168–69.
64. Id. at 170.

Sherman-Stokes_19 (Dukanovic).DOC (Do Not Delete)

May 2016]

5/10/2016 4:22 PM

SUFFICIENTLY SAFEGUARDED?

1035

incompetent, and that the trial should have been postponed until such time
65
as a psychiatric evaluation could be completed. In so holding, the Court
stated with certainty and clarity that refusal to try an incompetent
66
defendant “is fundamental to an adversary system of justice.” The practical
effect of the Court’s decision in Drope—a sort of gloss on Dusky—is that,
in a criminal proceeding, any evidence of mental illness, even where such
evidence appears minimal or solitary, should be considered in deciding
whether the defendant should undergo a psychiatric evaluation for
competency.
B. The Right to Self-Representation for Mentally Ill and
Incompetent Criminal Defendants
Indigent criminal defendants are entitled, under the Fourteenth
Amendment, to an attorney at trial, should they be unable to afford
67
one. However, in addition to guaranteeing a right to be represented by
counsel, the Supreme Court has further held that this right encompasses
68
the right of a criminal defendant to refuse counsel and represent herself.
But this right is not absolute. In 2008, the Supreme Court held that some
defendants—though competent to proceed to trial—might not be
69
competent to represent themselves at that criminal trial. Building on its
decision in Massey, the Supreme Court recognized in Edwards that “[i]n
certain instances an individual may well be able to satisfy Dusky’s mental
competence standard, . . . yet at the same time he may be unable to carry
out the basic tasks needed to present his own defense without the help of
70
counsel.” As the American Psychiatric Association (“APA”) pointed
out in an amicus brief, “‘[d]isorganized thinking, deficits in sustaining
attention and concentration, impaired expressive abilities, anxiety, and
other common symptoms of severe mental illnesses can impair the
defendant’s ability to play the significantly expanded role required for
71
self-representation.’” In making its decision that a higher level of
competence could be required for self-representation, the Court
emphasized the need to ensure integrity, efficiency, and fairness in the
trial process—goals that might be elusive where a defendant is not
72
competent to represent herself. Because the Supreme Court did not
further expound on what this standard should be or what abilities should

65. Id. at 179.
66. Id. at 172.
67. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 342–43 (1963).
68. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 819 (1975).
69. Indiana v. Edwards, 554 U.S. 164, 177–78 (2008).
70. Id. at 175–76.
71. Id. at 176 (citing Brief for the Am. Psychiatric Ass’n et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of
Neither Party, Indiana v. Edwards, 554 U.S. 164 (2008) (No. 07-208)).
72. Id. at 177.
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be evaluated in reaching a decision regarding self-representation, the
work of defining the parameters of a coherent test has been left to
73
74
courts and scholars —and that work continues today.
C. Competency Evaluations in Criminal Court and the Role of the
Criminal Court Judge
While the Supreme Court has outlined the rights of incompetent or
mentally ill criminal defendants, how does a criminal court even determine
whether someone is mentally ill or incompetent? In 1985, the Court in Ake
v. Oklahoma held that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment required the states to make psychiatric expert assistance
75
available to indigent criminal defendants. In the Court’s decision,
Justice Marshall explained that this was about “[m]eaningful access to
justice” and “the probable value of the psychiatric assistance sought, and
76
the risk of error in the proceeding if such assistance is not offered.” Of
course, the Court left to the individual states the decision of how to
implement this right, and what the scope and quality of this right would
77
look like.
Today, building on Ake, Dusky, Drope, and their progeny—and as
78
codified in the U.S. Code —once there is any question regarding a
79
criminal defendant’s competency, a competency evaluation is ordered.
What leads to this evaluation can be one or many factors: “evidence of a

73. See, e.g., United States v. McKinney, 373 F. App’x 74, 75 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (limiting application
of Edwards to cases where the defendant suffers from a mental illness); United States v. Carradine,
621 F.3d 575, 577 (6th Cir. 2010) (affirming denial of the defendant’s motion for self-representation
because, while he was not suffering from a diagnosed mental illness, when asked if he understood the
nature of his charges and his possible sentencing, the defendant was “obstinate and hostile” and said
he did not understand); United States v. Ferguson, 560 F.3d 1060, 1068 (9th Cir. 2009) (holding that
“[t]he standard for a defendant’s mental competence to stand trial is now different from the standard
for a defendant’s mental competence to represent himself or herself at trial,” but then remanding to
the district court without articulating the standard to be applied).
74. See, e.g., E. Lea Johnston, Representational Competence: Defining the Limits of the Right to
Self-Representation at Trial, 86 Notre Dame L. Rev. 523 (2011); Douglas R. Morris & Richard L.
Frierson, Pro Se Competence in the Aftermath of Indiana v. Edwards, 36 J. Am. Acad. Psychiatry L.
551, 555 (2008) (“[I]t is unclear what standard would differentiate a defendant who is merely
competent to stand trial from one who is competent both to stand trial and to represent himself.”);
Christopher Slobogin, Mental Illness and Self-Representation: Faretta, Godinez and Edwards, 7 Ohio
St. J. Crim. L. 391 (2009).
75. Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 78 (1985).
76. Id. at 77, 79.
77. Id. at 83; see also Pamela Casey & Ingo Keilitz, An Evaluation of Mental Health Expert
Assistance Provided to Indigent Criminal Defendants: Organization, Administration, and Fiscal
Management, 34 N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 19, 22 (1989).
78. 18 U.S.C. § 4241 (2016).
79. Of course, this does not mean there are not challenges and significant disparities that remain.
As scholars have argued, the promise of Ake has often fallen short. See, e.g., Casey & Keilitz, supra
note 77, at 22; Paul C. Giannelli, Ake v. Oklahoma: The Right to Expert Assistance in a Post-Daubert,
Post-DNA World, 89 Cornell L. Rev. 1305 (2004).
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defendant’s irrational behavior, his demeanor at trial, and any prior medical
opinion on competence to stand trial are all relevant in determining
whether further inquiry is required, but that even one of these factors
80
standing alone may, in some circumstances, be sufficient.” The practical
81
effect is that a relatively low bar exists for ordering a psychiatric evaluation.
Moreover, either party—the prosecutor or defense counsel—may make a
motion for a competency evaluation, or the judge may act sua sponte.
Once ordered, the question of who undertakes that evaluation seems
almost obvious in hindsight—not the judge nor the attorney, but rather a
mental health professional. The U.S. Code requires that
[a] psychiatric or psychological examination ordered pursuant to this
chapter shall be conducted by a licensed or certified psychiatrist or
psychologist, or, if the court finds it appropriate, by more than one
such examiner. Each examiner shall be designated by the court, except
that if the examination is ordered under section 4245, 4246, or 4248,
upon the request of the defendant an additional examiner may be
82
selected by the defendant.

The U.S. Code goes on to outline the standard information that
should be included in any psychiatric evaluation considered by the court,
including the defendant’s history and present symptoms; a description of
any test used during the examination; the findings of the examiner; and
the examiner’s opinions as to diagnosis, prognosis, and whether the
defendant is suffering from a mental disease or defect that would render
83
her not competent. Depending on the state and nature of the case, once
a competency evaluation is ordered, the defendant is typically remanded
to a mental health professional or state hospital for evaluation, and such
84
evaluation may be inpatient or outpatient. The process for evaluation—

80. See Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 180 (1975).
81. Id. at 179–80 (finding error to deny motion for psychiatric exam because previous evaluation
did not specifically address competence and defendant had history of irrational behavior). See, e.g.,
United States v. Nichelson, 550 F.2d 502, 504 (8th Cir. 1977) (finding error to deny motion for
psychiatric exam because defense counsel requested exam based on defendant’s inability to
intelligently communicate, family history of mental disturbance, and severe head injury suffered six
years before trial). But see, e.g., United States v. Weathington, 507 F.3d 1068, 1074 (7th Cir. 2007)
(finding no error to deny competency exam because defendant’s behavior suggested competency,
defendant did not call attention to psychiatric records, and defense attorney did not doubt
competency); United States v. Minnis, 489 F.3d 325, 329 (8th Cir. 2007) (finding no error to deny
motion for psychiatric exam because defendant able to assist in defense and complaints of stress, lack
of sleep, and depression not serious enough to render defendant incompetent); United States v.
Messervey, 317 F.3d 457, 462–64 (5th Cir. 2002) (finding no error to deny competency exam sua sponte
based solely on several minor episodes that occurred during trial because episodes not “sufficiently
manifest”); United States v. Oliver, 626 F.2d 254, 258 (2d Cir. 1980) (finding no error to deny motion
for psychiatric exam because defendant was responsive and not confused).
82. 18 U.S.C. § 4247(b) (20i6).
83. Id. at § 4247(c)(1)–(4)(A).
84. See, e.g., Bruce J. Winick, Reforming Incompetency to Stand Trial and Plead Guilty: A
Restated Proposal and a Response to Professor Bonnie, 85 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 571, 623–24
(1995). For sample procedures in Massachusetts, see Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 123, § 14–18 (20i6).
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which might, among other risks, put nondetained defendants at risk of
custody and commitment—certainly has its detractors. But most relevant
to the discussion in this Article is that once a question is raised as to a
criminal defendant’s competency, the role of a licensed or certified
mental health professional is paramount, and the role of the judge—at
least regarding the evaluation of a defendant’s competency—is
significantly diminished.
II. Scope of Current Protections for Detained, Mentally Ill, and
Incompetent Respondents in Immigration Court
Like criminal defendants facing imprisonment, noncitizens also face
high stakes in immigration removal proceedings, where removal could
lead to the erroneous deprivation of the rights of a U.S. citizen,
85
permanent exile, or return to persecution, torture or even death. But in
contrast to the more than sixty years of case law and consideration that
mental incompetency has received in the criminal courts, it is only in the
last several years that immigration courts have begun to confront the
mentally incompetent respondents that, presumably, have always been
86
before them.
At baseline, although not subject to the full panoply of
constitutional protections, the Supreme Court has recognized that
immigration proceedings must meet the due process requirements laid
87
out in the Fifth Amendment. So while noncitizens facing removal from
88
the United States are not provided with counsel, they must have a
reasonable opportunity to present, examine and object to the evidence
89
presented in their cases. For incompetent respondents, there is a
regulation from 1952 providing for “safeguards” to be prescribed where
“it is impracticable by reason of an alien’s mental incompetency for the
90
alien to be present at the proceeding.” In 1965, the Board issued its first
published decision interpreting this regulation, but offered no further
gloss on the substantive protections, or absence thereof, afforded to
85. Death by deportation is not hyperbole. In fact, many noncitizens who are removed from the
United States—either because their claims for asylum or other protections were unsuccessful, they did
not have a right to counsel, or they were unaware that any such protection could be available to
them—return to face harm, torture, and even death in their home countries. See, e.g., Armando Trull,
Deported from U.S., Honduran Immigrants Return to Death and Terror, WAMU 88.5 (Aug. 20, 2014),
http://wamu.org/news/14/08/20/death_and_terror_await_many_deported_honduran_immigrants.
86. See, e.g., In re H-, 6 I. & N. Dec. 358, 358 (B.I.A. 1954) (noting that the respondent was an
“alien of unsound mind”).
87. Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 306 (1993).
88. See INA § 292, 8 U.S.C. § 1362 (2016) (“In any removal proceedings before an immigration
judge and in any appeal proceedings before the Attorney General from any such removal proceedings,
the person concerned shall have the privilege of being represented (at no expense to the Government)
by such counsel, authorized to practice in such proceedings, as he shall choose.”).
89. See 8 C.F.R. § 1240.10(a)(4) (2016).
90. INA § 240a(b)(3), 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(3).
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mentally ill and mentally incompetent respondents. Prior to a
precedential Board decision in 2011, additional regulations provided for
special procedural safeguards to be set in place, concerning the
noncitizen’s receipt of the Notice to Appear, presence at her hearing, and
92
her admissions. But immigration judges had no guidance on what form
these safeguards should take, what standard should be applied in a
competency hearing or even whether, when, or how a competency hearing
should be held. Although policymakers and advocates made some
rumblings in the late 1990s and into the 2000s about increased protections
and safeguards for the mentally ill and incompetent, no meaningful
93
action was taken. Indeed, as will be discussed in greater depth infra,
more than fifty years passed before the Board gave even a modicum of
94
meaningful substance to the initial safeguard regulation.
A. Rights Afforded to Respondents in Removal Proceedings
Generally
Despite recent Supreme Court decisions that have acknowledged
95
the devastating consequences of removal proceedings and immigration
judges’ own admissions that removal proceedings are akin to trying “death
96
penalty cases” in “traffic court,” immigration removal proceedings have
97
long been characterized as civil, rather than criminal in nature. Along

91. In re Stoytcheff, 11 I. & N. Dec. 329, 332 (B.I.A. 1965) (holding that while the regulations
pertain to deportation and not exclusion proceedings, where a mentally incompetent respondent was
in exclusion proceedings the procedure was proper).
92. See, e.g., 8 C.F.R. §§ 1240.4, 1240.10(c), 103.5a(c)(2) (2016).
93. See Clapman, supra note 13. In 1997, action by the Department of Justice (“DOJ”), soliciting
comments on whether to promulgate regulations for appointing guardians ad litem in removal
proceedings, was followed by over a decade in which DOJ took more time to “further examine” the
“complex and sensitive” issue. Id. at 378–79. Furthermore, in 2009 members of Congress also acted
and introduced language into an appropriations bill to encourage the development of standards and
materials for competency evaluations in immigration court. Id. at 379. Subsequently, Congress
instructed EOIR to report back on what steps DOJ had taken to safeguard the rights of mentally
incompetent noncitizens, before finally noting additions to the nonbinding EOIR immigration judge
Benchbook in 2011, which suggested “best practices” for communicating with respondents who might
be mentally incompetent. Id.
94. Yáñez, supra note 26.
95. See Peter L. Markowitz, Deportation Is Different, 13 U. Pa. J. Const. L. 1299, 1299 (2011)
(arguing that Padilla v. Kentucky and other recent case law increasingly acknowledge that deportation
proceedings are “quasi-criminal” rather than purely civil in nature); see also Fadiga v. Att’y Gen. of
U.S., 488 F.3d 142, 157 n.23 (3d Cir. 2007) (“[W]e cannot treat immigration proceedings like everyday
civil proceedings . . . because unlike in everyday civil proceedings, the liberty of an individual is at
stake in deportation proceedings.”) (citations and quotation marks omitted).
96. Oversight Hearing on the Executive Office for Immigration Review: Hearing before Subcomm.
on Immigration, Citizenship, Refugees, Border Sec. & Int’l Law of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary 111th
Cong. 55 (2010) [hereinafter Oversight Hearing] (written statement of Hon. Dana Leigh Marks, Pres.
Nat’l Ass’n of Immigration Judges).
97. See Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 730 (1893) (holding that “[t]he order of
deportation is not a punishment for a crime”); see also Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination
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with this distinction comes a concurrent deprivation of substantive and
procedural protections for respondents facing the possibility of permanent
exile—from their families, their communities, and their livelihoods—and
possibly worse.
Under the INA, noncitizens are entitled to a limited number of
rights. Indeed, under the section “alien’s rights in proceeding,” the INA
tersely lists only three rights:
(A) the alien shall have the privilege of being represented, at no
expense to the Government, by counsel of the alien’s choosing who is
authorized to practice in such proceedings,
(B) the alien shall have a reasonable opportunity to examine the
evidence against the alien, to present evidence on the alien’s own
behalf, and to cross-examine witnesses presented by the Government
but these rights shall not entitle the alien to examine such national
security information as the Government may proffer in opposition to
the alien’s admission to the United States or to an application by the
alien for discretionary relief under this chapter, and
(C) a complete record shall be kept of all testimony and evidence
98
produced at the proceeding.

Of course, of these three rights, section A is limited and unavailable
to most respondents. In FY 2014, only fifty-five percent of respondents—
including both detained and nondetained respondents—were represented
99
100
by counsel, a four percent decline from the previous year. This left more
than 75,000 respondents to represent themselves, without counsel, in
101
their removal proceedings. And past studies have shown that detained
noncitizens are much more likely to proceed without the assistance of
102
counsel. Though on paper representation at one’s own expense is a right,
in practice it is nothing more than a privilege—extended to barely more
103
than half of the more than 100,000 persons facing removal each year.

Comm., 525 U.S. 471, 491 (1999) (holding that removal is not punishment); Immigration &
Naturalization Serv. v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1038 (1984) (“A deportation proceeding is a
purely civil action . . . [and is not intended] to punish.”); Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 594
(1952) (“Deportation, however severe its consequences, has been consistently classified as a civil
rather than criminal procedure.”).
98. INA § 240, 8 U.S.C. § 1229(b)(4)(A)–(C) (2016).
99. “Counsel” includes “[a]n attorney or other representative whom the Board of Immigration
Appeals has fully accredited as well as reputable individuals or law students or graduates under the
direct supervision of an attorney.” See Exec. Office of Immigration Review, U.S. Dep’t of Justice,
FY 2014 Statistics Yearbook F1 (2015).
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. See Andrew I. Schoenholtz & Hamutal Bernstein, Improving Immigration Adjudications
Through Competent Counsel, 21 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 55, 56 (2008); see also Peter L. Markowitz,
Barriers to Representation for Detained Immigrants Facing Deportation: Varick Street Detention
Facility, a Case Study, 78 Fordham L. Rev. 541 (2009).
103. Exec. Office of Immigration Review, supra note 99, at I2 (showing a total of 167,774
respondents in removal proceedings in FY 2014).
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In similar ways, section B can be limited by a respondent’s
104
circumstances. Child respondents, who are unrepresented and unable
105
to navigate a complex legal system pro se, are likely unable to
meaningfully execute that right. The same can be said for respondents
who are detained, non-English speaking, or mentally ill or incompetent.
Indeed, Jonathan was unable to secure evidence and documents, either
domestically or abroad, and surely would have been unable to crossexamine any government witnesses proffered, without the assistance of
counsel.
Finally, even section C presents a host of challenges. Until recently,
immigration courts relied on the immigration judge herself to manually
106
record all proceedings with a cassette player, which, not surprisingly,
107
led to a host of recording errors. And even though digital audio recording
has finally been implemented nationwide, “it is no panacea for many of the
108
shortcomings that have long plagued [immigration court] transcripts.”
In terms of a noncitizen’s due process rights, respondents in removal
proceedings are entitled only to a “full and fair hearing” under the Fifth
109
Amendment. But, like the rights enumerated in the INA, and as other
commentators have pointed out, mental incompetence directly undermines
110
a noncitizen’s ability to meaningfully exercise any of these rights.
B. The Current Competency Legal Framework for Respondents in
Immigration Removal Proceedings
Immigration law has long recognized the existence of mental illness,
reserving special animus for “idiots” and “insane persons” as far back as
111
1891. But early recognition that some noncitizens might be mentally ill

104. See, e.g., Ashley Ham Pong, Humanitarian Protections and the Need for Appointed Counsel
for Unaccompanied Immigrant Children Facing Deportation, 21 Wash. & Lee J. C.R. & Soc. Just. 69,
76 (2014) (explaining that “[e]ach side is presumed to have the ability to represent its own interests
before the immigration judge, who then makes a determination in favor of the government or the
child,” an exceedingly challenging task for an unrepresented child).
105. As the Ninth Circuit noted, “[w]ith only a small degree of hyperbole, the immigration laws
have been termed ‘second only to the Internal Revenue Code in its complexity.’ A lawyer is often the
only person who could thread the labyrinth.” Castro-O’Ryan v. U.S. Dep’t of Immgr. &
Naturalization, 847 F.2d 1307, 1312 (9th Cir. 1987) (citations omitted).
106. In testimony before the House Judiciary Committee, Immigration Judge Dana Leigh Marks
bemoaned the “spartan” conditions faced by immigration judges, noting for example, that immigration
judges “are responsible for operating the recording equipment that creates the official administrative
record of the proceedings.” Oversight Hearing, supra note 96.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. In re Beckford, 22 I. & N. Dec. 1216, 1225 (B.I.A. 2000); see also Shaughnessey v. United
States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 212 (1953) (explaining that immigration proceedings conform to
traditional standards of fairness consistent with due process).
110. Marouf, supra note 12.
111. Immigration Act of 1891, ch. 551, 26 Stat. 1084 (excluding large classes of noncitizens
including “[a]ll idiots, insane persons, paupers or persons likely to become a public charge”).
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or incompetent was outward looking and exclusionary—seen as a basis
by which to keep them out, rather than a factor to consider in weighing
whether they could stay or whether their rights, while here, were, or
should be, protected. And indeed, because this early recognition was
focused on exclusion—that is, preventing the admission of noncitizens
into the United States—a consideration of what rights were afforded to
the mentally ill and incompetent, let alone whether those rights were
112
sufficient, was inapposite because historically, in exclusion proceedings,
113
noncitizens receive little due process.
Because the only consideration of mental illness was in exclusion
proceedings, immigration courts have been dramatically behind other
adjudicatory bodies in recognizing the special needs of their most
vulnerable respondents, identifying which bundle of rights might apply to
them and ensuring that those rights are protected. In stark contrast to the
body of law that has emerged and developed in the criminal justice
context, the INA recognizes only that noncitizens in removal proceedings
may be mentally incompetent, without providing further guidance as to
how such a determination should be made or by whom.
In short, the INA states that if it is impracticable by reason of an
alien’s mental incompetency for the alien to be present at the proceeding,
the Attorney General shall prescribe safeguards to protect the rights and
114
privileges of the alien. The INA fails to set a standard for competency,
a process for competency determination, or details regarding the substance
or implementation of appropriate safeguards. It was not until 2011—more
than sixty years after Dusky—that the Board provided meaning to either
the procedure for determining competency or the safeguards to be imposed
in cases where competency is absent. Between the Supreme Court’s

112. Prior to 1996, there were two types of proceedings: (1) “deportation proceedings” that
encompassed noncitizens who had been admitted to the United States, and (2) “exclusion
proceedings” that were reserved for those noncitizens who were seeking admission. Today, both of
these kinds of proceedings fall under the broader umbrella of “removal proceedings.”
113. See Shaughnessy, 345 U.S. at 212 (“[A]liens who have once passed through our gates, even
illegally, may be expelled only after proceedings conforming to traditional standards of fairness
encompassed in due process of law. . . . But an alien on the threshold of initial entry stands on a
different footing: ‘Whatever the procedure authorized by Congress is, it is due process as far as an
alien denied entry is concerned.’”) (quoting United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537,
544 (1950)); Kaoru Yamataya v. Fisher, 189 U.S. 86, 98 (1903) (holding that noncitizens get procedural
due process protection in deportation proceedings but stating that, with respect to noncitizens seeking
initial entry, “the decisions of executive or administrative officers, acting within powers expressly
conferred by Congress, are due process of law”). But see Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Power of Congress to
Limit the Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts: An Exercise in Dialectic, 66 Harv. L. Rev. 1362, 1394
(1953) (“Granting that the requirements of due process must vary with the circumstances, and
allowing them all the flexibility that can conceivably be claimed, it still remains true that the Court is
obliged, by the presuppositions of its whole jurisdiction in this area, to decide whether what has been
done is consistent with due process—and not simply pass back the buck to an assertedly all-powerful
and unimpeachable Congress.”).
114. INA § 240(b)(3), 8 U.S.C. § 1229(c) (2016).
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decision in Dusky, and the Board’s decision in 2011, the Supreme Court
would decide nearly a dozen additional cases concerning competency
115
and mentally illness in criminal proceedings.
116
In 2011, the Board, in In re M-A-M-, set forth instructions for
(1) when immigration judges should make competency determinations;
(2) what factors they should consider and what procedures they should
employ to make those determinations; and (3) what safeguards to
117
prescribe when competency is not established. This Subpart examines
each in turn.
As a threshold matter, as in criminal proceedings, competency is
118
presumed in immigration proceedings. The Board has yet to hold that
the due process rights of an incompetent respondent have been violated
119
during removal proceedings. And notwithstanding that immigration
proceedings lack many of the baseline procedural protections afforded in
criminal proceedings, including a right to counsel at government expense,
the competency standard is borrowed heavily from the criminal law. The
test is, whether the respondent in removal proceedings, “has a rational
and factual understanding of the nature and object of the proceedings,
can consult with the attorney or representative if there is one, and has a
reasonable opportunity to examine and present evidence and cross120
examine witnesses.”
How might an immigration judge begin this inquiry? The Board
proposes that immigration judges look for “indicia of incompetency”
including observing behavior of the respondent that suggests competency
121
concerns or examining record evidence of mental illness or incompetency.
Such inquiry assumes that, in the case of an unrepresented respondent who

115. See Indiana v. Edwards, 554 U.S. 164 (2008); Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166 (2003);
Cooper v. Oklahoma, 517 U.S. 348 (1996); Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389 (1993); Medina v.
California, 505 U.S. 437 (1992); Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127 (1992); Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S.
399 (1986); Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454 (1981); Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 179 (1975) (finding
in considering whether any doubt exists regarding the defendant’s competency, any and all evidence
should be considered); Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 731 (1972) (holding where a criminal
defendant is incompetent to stand trial, he cannot be subject to indefinite commitment on this basis
alone); Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 377 (1966) (holding due process requires a competency
hearing).
116. 25 I. & N. Dec. 474, 476 (B.I.A. 2011).
117. Id.
118. Id. at 477 (citing Muñoz-Monsalve v. Mukasey, 551 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 2008) (finding that it is
the noncitizen’s burden to first raise the issue of competency)).
119. Federal courts have been more willing to make this finding. See, e.g., Bartolo v. Holder, 495 F.
App’x 825, 826 (9th Cir. 2012) (holding that an immigration judge, in excluding a noncitizen
respondent from the courtroom, where he suffered from serious mental illness, out of concern that he
might disrupt proceedings, and in then allowing the respondent’s counsel to withdraw most of the
grounds for asylum asserted in the respondent’s application, without ever inquiring whether the
respondent had consented to this withdrawal, violated the respondent’s right to due process).
120. In re M-A-M-, 25 I. & N. Dec. at 479.
121. Id. at 477.
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cannot advocate for herself, either (1) mental illness or incompetency is
obvious to an untrained eye, and/or (2) DHS provides the court with
materials relevant to this inquiry. Because the former is a complex and
122
dynamic assessment and the latter is not required by the regulations,
this initial inquiry is extremely problematic.
And even where incompetency is found in removal proceedings, a
123
long line of cases establishes that removal may still move forward. Only
124
the baseline—complying with “fundamental fairness”—is required. To
that end, so long as a mentally incompetent respondent is provided an
attorney (at no expense to the government), provided the opportunity to
examine and present evidence, and provided an opportunity to cross125
examine witnesses, then fundamental fairness is satisfied.
Where an immigration judge finds indicia of incompetency, the next
question is how an immigration judge—often with little mental health
training—is to assess competency in the courtroom. The Board has made
several recommendations including asking simple questions about
proceedings, granting a continuance to allow parties to gather or submit
relevant evidence, requesting a psychological evaluation, and allowing
for a change of venue so that a respondent can receive medical care or
126
counsel. Subsequent to the Board’s decision in In re M-A-M-, EOIR
expanded on this guidance in its “Phase I Plan to Provide Enhanced
122. DHS also has an obligation to hand over relevant materials. See 8 C.F.R. § 1240.2(a) (2016).
123. See, e.g., Muñoz-Monsalve, 551 F.3d at 6 (holding that immigration judge’s failure to sua
sponte order a competency evaluation of a represented alien did not violate alien’s due process rights
as it is advocate’s role to broach issue of mental competence as alien’s incompetence was not evident
from record of hearing); Brue v. Gonzales, 464 F.3d 1227, 1233 (10th Cir. 2006) (holding that
immigration judge had no obligation under either statute or regulation to consider represented alien’s
mental competency because procedural safeguards they envision were already in place); SanchezSalvador v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., No. 92-70828, 1994 WL 441755, at *1 (9th Cir. Aug.
15, 1994) (internal citations omitted) (“Lack of competency, however, does not prevent a judge from
determining either deportability or whether to grant relief. As we held in Nee Hao Wong v. I.N.S., . . .
an alien can obtain a full and fair hearing despite being incompetent. This was the case here. SanchezSalvador’s incompetence did not prevent him from presenting, through counsel, a strong case that
relief is warranted.”); In re James, No. A040 015 111, 2009 WL 2171712, at *2 (B.I.A. June 26, 2009)
(citations omitted) (“In this instance, . . . the respondent’s counsel failed to request that an evaluation
of the respondent’s competency be undertaken. The failure to raise the competency issue in a timely
manner renders an ensuing appellate claim of error on this basis particularly weak. . . . Moreover,
contrary to the substantive due process protection from trial and conviction to which a mentally
incompetent criminal defendant is entitled, removal proceedings may go forward against incompetent
aliens.”); In re Vidal Sanchez, No. A037 616 891, 2006 WL 2008263, at *2 (B.I.A. May 24, 2006) (“The
respondent was represented at the healing [sic]; therefore, his rights were adequately protected.”); In
re H-, 6 I. & N. Dec. 358, 358 (B.I.A. 1954) (holding that the requirements of a fair hearing had not
been violated in deportation proceedings involving an alien of unsound mind, where notice of hearing
has been served on the alien and his wife, arrangements were made to protect alien’s interests by
having a doctor in attendance at the hearing, and alien was represented by legal counsel who was given
the privilege of introducing evidence and cross-examining witnesses).
124. See, e.g., Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 152–53 (1945).
125. 8 U.S.C. § 1229(a) (2016).
126. In re M-A-M-, 25 I. & N. Dec. at 481–82.
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Procedural Protections to Unrepresented Detained Respondents with
127
Mental Disorders.”
The Phase I Plan provides specific lines of
questioning and phrasing, including questions about cognitive, emotional,
and behavioral functioning; ability to respond to allegations and charges;
understanding and ability to exercise rights and privileges; and ability to
128
present information and respond to questions relevant to relief.
Finally, if an immigration judge—regardless of whether she is
relying on a mental health evaluation—finds that a noncitizen “lacks
129
sufficient competency to proceed,” then she “shall impose” safeguards.
The Board has enumerated a nonexhaustive list of potential safeguards—
any of which a judge may impose at her discretion—including refusal to
accept an admission of removability from an unrepresented respondent;
identification and appearance of a family member or close friend who
can assist the respondent and provide the court with information;
docketing or managing the case to facilitate the respondent’s ability to
obtain legal representation and/or medical treatment in an effort to restore
competency; participation of a guardian in the proceedings; continuance of
the case for good cause shown; closing the hearing to the public; waiving
the respondent’s appearance; actively aiding in the development of the
record, including the examination and cross-examination of witnesses;
130
and reserving appeal rights for the respondent. Where safeguards are
imposed, an immigration judge—must provide reasoning and rationale
131
for her decision. Finally, the Board acknowledges that there might be
instances in which no safeguards are sufficient. In such circumstances,
“alternatives” may be pursued between the parties, but the only
132
suggestion provided by the Board is administrative closure.
In the four years since the Board decided In re M-A-M-, there have
been only two subsequent precedential Board decisions on
competencyneither of which has explicitly considered the role of the
immigration judge in competency determinations. In 2013, the Board
decided In re E-S-I-, regarding service of the Notice to Appear on an
133
incompetent respondent where such incompetency was “manifest.” The
Board held that in such cases, the Notice to Appear should be served on
three individuals:
(1) a person with whom the respondent resides, who, when the
respondent is detained in a penal or mental institution, will be

127. Exec. Office for Immigration Review, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Phase I of Plan to Provide
Enhanced Procedural Protections to Unrepresented Detained Respondents with Mental
Disorders (2013).
128. Id.
129. In re M-A-M-, 25 I. & N. Dec. at 481.
130. Id. at 483.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. In re E-S-I-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 136, 144 (B.I.A. 2013).
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someone in a position of demonstrated authority in the institution or
his or her delegate and, when the respondent is not detained, will be a
responsible party in the household, if available; (2) whenever
applicable or possible, a relative, guardian, or person similarly close to
134
the respondent; and (3) in most cases, the respondent.

Where service is not proper, an immigration judge should grant a
135
continuance to allow DHS to execute proper service. Similarly, where
indicia of incompetency arise at a later point in the proceedings, one
safeguard that can be made available by an immigration judge is reservice
136
of the Notice to Appear.
In 2015, the Board decided In re J-R-R-A-, the first holding of its
137
138
kind to address credibility assessments in competency cases. In J-RR-A-, the Board considered the case of a Honduran respondent seeking
asylum. Before the immigration judge, the respondent had provided
139
testimony that was “disjointed,” “confusing” and “nonresponsive.”
While the respondent’s counsel raised a concern about the respondent’s
mental competency, the record was not further developed and the
immigration judge did not follow the steps outlined in In re M-A-M-. In
fact, the immigration judge seemed to imply that the respondent’s
potential mental deficiencies were irrelevant, stating that competency
140
issues were “not a license to give incredible testimony.” On appeal, the
Board grappled with what kind of credibility assessment to apply where a
respondent’s testimony might be impacted by mental disability. In an
asylum claim, the respondent must demonstrate both a genuine subjective
fear of persecution in the country of return and present evidence to
establish that such fear is reasonable. A respondent’s testimony alone is
sufficient to meet this burden only where such testimony is “credible,
141
persuasive and refers to specific facts.” As the Board explained, testimony
that includes inconsistencies, implausible evidence, or is otherwise
unreliable may be indicative not of fabrication but of a respondent’s
mental illness. The Board held that,
where a mental health concern may be affecting the reliability of the
applicant’s testimony, the Immigration Judge should, as a safeguard,
generally accept that the applicant believes what he has presented,

134. Id. at 145.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. In 2005, President George W. Bush signed the Real ID Act into law, significantly affecting
asylum seekers and refugees. REAL ID Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-13, 119 Stat. 302 (2005). In short,
the Real ID Act creates heightened standards for credibility and corroboration of asylum claims as
well as changing certain standards of review. The practical effect of Real ID has been to make it easier
for an immigration judge to find that a respondent lacks credibility in making her claim.
138. In re J-R-R-A-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 609 (B.I.A. 2015).
139. Id. at 610.
140. Id.
141. INA § 208(b)(1)(B)(ii), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(ii) (2016).
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even though his account may not be believable to others or otherwise
sufficient to support the claim. The Immigration Judge should then
focus on whether the applicant can meet his burden of proof based on
142
the objective evidence of record and other relevant issues.

Finally, and also in 2015, the Board decided In re J-S-S-, holding
that neither DHS nor the respondent “bears a formal burden of proof in
immigration proceedings to establish whether or not the respondent is
mentally competent, but where indicia of incompetency are identified,
the immigration judge should determine if a preponderance of the evidence
143
establishes that the respondent is competent.” In In re J-S-S-, the
respondent had argued that he should bear the initial burden to raise a
competency issue, but that once indicia of incompetency are established,
the burden should shift to DHS to show, by a preponderance of the
evidence that the respondent is competent to proceed or that adequate
144
safeguards could be implemented to protect his due process rights. The
Board disagreed, preferring the framework suggested by the DHS in
which neither party bears a formal burden and there is, the Board
suggested, more of a “collaborative approach” to fully develop the
145
record regarding the respondent’s competency. In putting forth this
framework for allocating the burden of proof, the Board specifically
146
emphasized the “civil” nature of immigration removal proceedings.
While the Board’s decisions in M-A-M-, E-S-I-, J-R-R-A-, and J-S-Sgive some substance and meaning to the statute’s almost passing—and
until now, seemingly empty—reference to the imposition of safeguards,
big questions still remain unresolved. While not all of these questions can
be addressed in this Article, subsequent subparts will contend with
whether In re M-A-M- sets forth an adequate competency standard, how
such standard should be applied, and what the role of the immigration
judge and mental health evaluator should be, respectively.
C. The Success of the FRANCO-GONZALEZ Litigation and Increased
Protections for Some Mentally Ill and Incompetent
Respondents
147

148

149

In August of 2010, advocates filed a class action complaint in
the Central District of California on behalf of “indigent individuals,

142. In re J-R-R-A, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 612.
143. In re J-S-S-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 679, 679 (B.I.A. 2015). In In re J-S-S-, the Board also held that a
finding of competency is a finding of fact that the Board reviews under the clearly erroneous standard.
Id.
144. Id. at 681.
145. Id. at 682.
146. Id. at 683 (applying the same burden allocation employed in federal habeas proceedings,
“which are also civil in nature”).
147. Interestingly, In re M-A-M- was decided in 2011, shortly after the initial filing in FrancoGonzalez.
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detained by the United States, who suffer from mental disabilities that
may render them incompetent to defend themselves, but who are
150
nevertheless forced to do so in immigration court.” Specifically, the
claim was brought on behalf of detainees with mental disabilities in
Arizona, California, and Washington State.
The Plaintiffs alleged (1) violations of the INA; (2) violations of the
Due Process Clause of the Constitution; and (3) violations of Section 504
151
of the Rehabilitation Act. On April 23, 2013, the court granted
judgment in favor of the plaintiffs. The court held that appointment of a
qualified representative is a reasonable accommodation under the
152
Rehabilitation Act. The court went on to clarify—and rebut DHS’s
argument to the contrary—that provision of counsel is not an expansion
of benefits but rather the means by which the plaintiffs in this case would
153
be able to exercise the same benefits as other nondisabled detainees. In
short, the court’s order requires ICE, the Attorney General, and the
EOIR to provide legal representation to immigrant detainees with
mental disabilities who are facing deportation and who are unable to
adequately represent themselves in immigration hearings. In addition to
the provision of counsel, the court held that plaintiffs in the case are
entitled to a custody determination hearing after 180 days in detention,
154
at which time the government, rather than the respondent, bears the
burden of justifying continued detention by clear and convincing
evidence.
Incidentally, the court’s ruling on April 23, 2013, came just one day
after ICE and EOIR simultaneously issued new guidance for the
handling of mentally ill and mentally incompetent detainees in removal
155
proceedings. Since the permanent injunction issued in April 2013, the

148. The advocates were ACLU of Southern California, ACLU Immigrants’ Rights Project, Public
Counsel, Sullivan & Cromwell LLP, ACLU of San Diego, ACLU of Arizona, Mental Health
Advocacy Services, and the Northwest Immigrants Rights Project.
149. The class action was filed against Attorney General Eric H. Holder, Jr., Acting Director of
the Executive Office of Immigration Review Thomas G. Snow, Secretary of Homeland Security Janet
Napolitano, Assistant Secretary of U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement John Morton, and
Field Office Director for the Los Angeles District of U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement
Timothy S. Robbins.
150. First Amended Class-Action Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief & Petition for
Writ of Habeas Corpus, Franco-Gonzalez v. Holder, No. 10-CV-02211 DMG (DTB) (C.D. Cal. Aug.
2, 2010).
151. Franco-Gonzalez v. Holder, No. CV 10-02211 DMG (DTBx), 2013 WL 3674492, at *1 (C.D.
Cal. Apr. 23, 2013).
152. Id. at *3.
153. Id. at *7.
154. Id. at *10.
155. See Memorandum from John Morton, Dir., Exec. Office for Immigration Review, U.S. Dep’t
of Justice, to Thomas D. Homan, Acting Exec. Assoc. Dir., Enf’t & Removal Operations (Apr. 22,
2013) (on file with author); Memorandum from Brian M. O’Leary, Chief Immigration Judge, U.S.
Dep’t of Justice, to All Immigration Judges (Apr. 22, 2013) (on file with author).
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court has issued a second order, in October of 2014, further
implementing the injunction and spelling out measures the defendants
are required to implement, including protocols around (1) screening and
information
gathering;
(2) information
sharing;
(3) competency
156
evaluations and (4) applicability of the order to released class members.
On March 2, 2015, the Court in Franco-Gonzalez appointed a
157
monitor to oversee the Government’s compliance with (1) the district
court’s April 2013 order granting a Permanent Injunction requiring the
Government to, inter alia, provide legal representation to any class
member who is determined to be incompetent to represent herself by
reason of a serious mental disability; and (2) the district court’s October
2014 further order regarding implementation, which set forth both
substantive and procedural rules for determining the competency of
158
Franco-Gonzalez class members who have serious mental disabilities.
As of this writing, the monitor is well underway in her comprehensive
review of the district court’s orders and while many plaintiffs in
Washington State, California, and Arizona no doubt are benefitting from
the court’s orders, those outside the jurisdiction have been left waiting.
Today, more than two years have passed since EOIR and ICE’s Phase I
announcements, which came on the heels of the Franco-Gonzalez
litigation. And yet, the policies and procedures outlined in the EOIR and
ICE memoranda have yet to be implemented in most cities across the
United States.
Despite the unquestionable success of the Franco-Gonzalez litigation,
and as discussed in Subpart II.D, below, the order still does not require
what this Article advocates—a central role for a mental health
professional in competency determinations.
D. On the Ground Realities for Mentally Ill and Incompetent
Noncitizens in Removal Proceedings
On December 31, 2013, EOIR announced expanded guidance on
their “Phase I Plan to Provide Enhanced Procedural Protections to
Unrepresented Detained Respondents with Mental Disorders.” Between

156. Of particular note and importance, the order sets out a newly articulated “pro se competency
standard.” The competency standard set out in Franco-Gonzalez requires not only that the respondent
satisfy the “meaningful participation” standard outlined in In re M-A-M-, but also that the respondent
possess sufficient present ability to perform additional functions necessary for self-representation
including the ability to make informed decisions about if or when to waive certain rights, respond to
charges and allegations, present information relevant to eligibility for relief, and act upon instructions
and information presented by the immigration judge and government counsel. Order Further
Implementing this Court’s Permanent Injunction, Franco-Gonzalez v. Holder, No. CV-10-02211 DMG
(DTBx), 2014 WL 5475097, at *6 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 24, 2014).
157. Order Appointing Monitor, Franco-Gonzalez v. Holder, No. CV-10-02211 DMG (DTBx)
(C.D. Cal. Mar. 2, 2015).
158. Order Further Implementing this Court’s Permanent Injunction, supra note 156.
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May 2015 and August 2015—approximately eighteen months after the
announcement of this expanded guidance—the Author conducted
159
interviews with removal defense practitioners at ten different sites
across the country, including both jurisdictions where the Franco160
Gonzalez order is and is not in force. At the eight sites where the
Franco-Gonzalez order was not in force, the Author found enthusiasm
about the prospects of enhanced protections, but did not find any
evidence that the enhanced protections detailed in the December 31,
161
2013, guidance were being put in place on the ground.
In interviews at these ten sites, one overarching trend that emerged
was the increased role of immigration judges in competency determinations
and a significantly smaller—if not absent—role for mental health
professionals in helping judges to arrive at these decisions. The following
summarizes the problem and the impact on respondents when immigration
judges make competency determinations without the benefit of mental
health expertise, evaluation, or in-court testimony.
1.

Immigration Judges Are Currently Ill-Equipped to Evaluate a
Respondent’s Mental Competency

In contrast to the standard set out in Dusky, the standard set out in
In re M-A-M- is less robust in articulation and is unevenly applied by
immigration judges, who have received little, if any, training on mental
illness and mental incompetence. Although In re M-A-M- includes
language similar to that articulated in Dusky, requiring the respondent to
have a “rational and factual understanding” of the nature and object of
the proceedings against her, because there is no right to counsel at
government expense in removal proceedings, unlike in Dusky, there is no
similar requirement that a respondent be able to consult with a lawyer
with a reasonable degree of rational understanding. The language in In re
M-A-M- simply states that if there is a lawyer—a considerable and
meaningful “if” in removal proceedings—that a respondent “can
consult” with her. In re M-A-M- does not require that such consultation

159. Author uses the term “practitioner” rather than attorney as several interviewees were BIAaccredited representatives, and while fully able to practice before the immigration court, they are not
licensed attorneys. See 8 C.F.R. §§ 292.2, 1292.2 (2016).
160. Author interviewed immigration attorneys and practitioners at both Franco-Gonzalez and
non-Franco-Gonzalez sites including in Arizona, Pennsylvania, Washington State, Virginia/Maryland,
New Jersey, New York, Massachusetts, and three locations in Texas. All practitioners were
interviewed by phone.
161. See, e.g., Interview with Pennsylvania Immigration Practitioner (July 7, 2015) (on file with
author) (“I haven’t seen any changes since Phase I [was] announced.”); Interview with New Jersey
Immigration Practitioner (June 10, 2015) (on file with author) (explaining that she has heard that the
EOIR expects to roll out Phase I at fifteen sites by late summer but that, “they haven’t implemented it
here yet”); Interview with Texas Immigration Practitioner (on file with author) (“The [Phase I]
program hasn’t rolled out here.”).
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be anything other than perfunctory—is it the ability to simply say hello?
Relay critical case information? Articulate a cognizable defense to
deportation? Demonstrate fear of return to a home country? None of
this is spelled out, leaving a gaping hole in what is meant to be a
protection against the removal of incompetent respondents. Even
Franco-Gonzalez states, where protections for mentally ill and incompetent
respondents are more robust, counsel is only provided after the In re M-A162
M- hearing. This means that protections that would otherwise be in line
with the more robust standard articulated in Dusky and Drope begin to
fall apart.
Even if strengthened, a lack of meaningful guidance and training of
immigration judges means that application of the In re M-A-M- standard
still varies widely across courtrooms. For example, some judges focus on
163
whether the detainee has “a linear thought process” —not a prong in
the In re M-A-M- analysis and yet a litmus test for some adjudicators.
Other judges, despite an admitted lack of specialized EOIR training on
the subject, feel that their experience in the courtroom leaves them well
164
poised to ascertain competence among unrepresented respondents.
Specifically, whether immigration judges are applying the rational and
165
factual standard correctly remains an open question.
Practitioners across the country also voice concerns about the ability
166
of immigration judges alone to arrive at competency decisions. In fact,

162. Franco-Gonzalez, 2014 WL 5475097, at *8; see also Interview with New Jersey Immigration
Practitioner (June 10, 2015) (on file with author) (noting the problem of appointed counsel only after a
competency determination is made and questioning, “if no attorney [is appointed] until after a finding
of competency, how can an [immigration judge] evaluate [the respondent’s] ability to cooperate with
an attorney?”).
163. Interview with Immigration Judge (July 16, 2015) (on file with author).
164. See, e.g., Interview with Immigration Judge (July 16, 2015) (on file with author) (“I feel like I
can sort this out . . . [T]hey don’t need to be devoid of paranoia, they just need to know what’s going
on in [the courtroom].”).
165. Interview with Immigration Judge (July 16, 2015) (on file with author) (explaining that “if
they tell you I could be deported—then they know [the nature of the proceeding])”; see also Interview
with New Jersey Immigration Practitioner (June 10, 2015) (on file with author) (explaining instance in
which a removal defense attorney struggled to help an immigration judge understand the difference
between a “rational” and a “factual” understanding of the proceedings: “[I] was explaining the
difference between rational versus factual understanding of proceedings—I agreed that my client had
a factual understanding—he knew I was [his] lawyer, he knew the date—she didn’t see it”); Interview
with New York Immigration Practitioner (June 9, 2015) (on file with author) (explaining that an
immigration judge believed a client to be competent where “he could answer [questions about the]
dates he came here and siblings’ names” and that it was not until the respondent’s counsel herself
cross-examined the respondent that he “decompensated” and the immigration judge and DHS
attorney were able to see his “disoriented thinking and delusions”).
166. Interview with Arizona Immigration Practitioner (June 3, 2015) (on file with author)
(explaining that despite a lack of rigorous training, “from their perspective, they seem totally
comfortable with [making competency determinations]”); Interview with Massachusetts Immigration
Practitioner (May 28, 2015) (on file with author) (“I think that judges who may be very well trained in
law and very intelligent, [and] might know a lot about the world, without that specific in depth training
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practitioners themselves concede their own, at times, inability to reliably
167
determine which of their clients are truly incompetent to proceed. And
practitioner and respondent experiences in courtroom application of the
168
Indeed, some
In re M-A-M- standard remain wildly uneven.
practitioners have even articulated the exact fear that Dusky warns
against—that orientation to time and place will be mistaken for a
169
respondent’s competency. Ultimately, in both states covered by the
Franco-Gonzalez order and those without Franco-Gonzalez protections
in place, the problem is not that immigration judges are the ultimate
arbiters of competence, but that they too often arrive at their decisions
having had little guidance in mental health law and without the benefit of
a psychiatric evaluation or in-court testimony. In these ways, even in
Franco-Gonzalez states—where counsel, if appointed, does not arrive
until after a competency determination is made—mentally ill and
incompetent detainees are left vulnerable and unprotected.

and experience day in and day out of clinical work with mentally ill people, they may not understand
mental health disorders and how they manifest [and they] can come away with a misimpression” that
is, they “might dismiss something as relatively insignificant that is quite significant. [For example],
something they might think is a bad memory or is lying, might actually be, for example, a characteristic
of a certain disorder.”). But see Interview with New York Immigration Practitioner (June 9, 2015) (on
file with author) (describing judges in her jurisdiction as “very uncomfortable making a decision”
about competency and delaying making such decisions for weeks, even in the case of detained
respondents); Interview with Maryland/Virginia Immigration Practitioner (May 21, 2015) (on file with
author) (explaining that in her experience, most judges would “prefer to avoid a competency analysis
if at all possible . . . because . . . [there] hasn’t been sufficient training on even basic things like what
are indicia and different types of illnesses that might be appearing in front of them in addition to a lack
of training about what the legal standard is and what legal safeguards it’s appropriate for them to be
using once [a] competency determination has been made”).
167. Interview with Massachusetts Immigration Practitioner (May 28, 2015) (on file with author)
(explaining the difficulty, even for an experienced practitioner who has worked with numerous
mentally ill and mentally incompetent respondents, in identifying mental competence). That
practitioner explained,
For a lay person like myself, [a respondent] might for example talk relatively fluidly, but
only if you have particular expertise and knowledge do you find the gaps or realize that they
might be talking fluidly but not based in reality or that they might be able to have a cogent,
or what seems like a cogent, conversation and then really not very long after, have very
little grasp of what transpired in that conversation.
Id.
168. Interview with Arizona Immigration Practitioner (June 3, 2015) (on file with author)
(“Another thing the judges will do [is] if someone really struggles, they’ll keep asking questions, [until
it] becomes more and more leading, until they elicit the ‘right’ answers.”).
169. Interview with Arizona Immigration Practitioner (June 3, 2015) (on file with author) (“I just
think that if the judges talk to someone and basically feel like they’re oriented to place and time and
that they’ve demonstrated a basic understanding that [the Immigration] Judge could either deport
them or grant them relief or release . . . even if [the respondent] struggles, they’ll find them
competent.”).
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Absent a Psychiatric Evaluation, Immigration Judges Are
Equating Competence with Competence to Proceed Pro Se

The standard set forth in In re M-A-M- presumes that any noncitizen
competent to stand trial in removal proceedings is also competent to
represent herself during those proceedings. Because noncitizens in
removal proceedings are not provided counsel at government expense, this
would in fact be the result of a favorable competency determination by
an immigration judge—that a respondent would proceed to represent
herself in a proceeding that could result in her permanent exile from the
170
United States. But successfully defending a respondent in an immigration
171
removal hearing is challenging even for the most skilled attorneys. At a
minimum, a removal proceeding involves first, an initial determination of
inadmissibility and deportability, deeply complex areas of law. Where a
respondent has been charged with or convicted of a crime, an analysis of
the impact of that criminal disposition on immigration status is both
exceedingly relevant and uniquely complicated. Indeed, Justice Alito has
opined that not even criminal defense attorneys—highly skilled and
barred lawyers—should be required to understand or undertake such
172
analysis. If unrepresented by counsel, it is then up to a detained
respondent to prepare applications for relief, gather evidence—which
might be located abroad—identify lay witnesses, as well as country and
medical experts, and prepare for direct and cross-examination by a
skilled and highly trained government lawyer.
Fortunately, a pro se competency standard in removal proceedings
is not without precedent. In the order further implementing the district
court’s permanent injunction in Franco-Gonzalez, a comprehensive pro
173
se competency standard is laid out. As articulated by the district court,
the pro se competency standard includes satisfaction of two prongs. First,

170. Interview with Massachusetts Immigration Practitioner (May 28, 2015) (on file with author)
(Post-M-A-M-, “I’ve definitely seen individuals whose incompetence went under the radar” and who
then proceeded pro se in their removal proceedings.).
171. See, e.g., Drax v. Reno, 338 F.3d 98, 99 (2d Cir. 2003) (“This case vividly illustrates the
labyrinthine character of modern immigration law—a maze of hyper-technical statutes and regulations
that engender waste, delay, and confusion for the Government and petitioners alike.”); see also Nurith
C. Aizenman, Md. Family Ensnared in Immigration Maze, Wash. Post (Apr. 24, 2001),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/local/2001/04/24/md-family-ensnared-in-immigration-maze/
d3715174-1294-4a16-9743-02803b6f7c4f/. According to INS spokeswoman Karen Kraushaar,
“[i]mmigration law is a mystery and a mastery of obfuscation, and the lawyers who can figure it out are
worth their weight in gold.” Id.
172. Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 380–81 (2010) (Alito, J., concurring) (describing a number
of immigration terms of art whose meaning is ambiguous or difficult to ascertain). “The professional
organizations and guidebooks on which the Court so heavily relies are right to say that ‘nothing is ever
simple with immigration law’—including the determination whether immigration law clearly makes a
particular offense removable.” Id.
173. Franco-Gonzalez v. Holder, No. CV-10-0221i DMG (DTBx), 2014 WL 5475097, at *6–7 (C.D.
Cal. Oct. 29, 2014).
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and as a threshold determination, the respondent must be able to
meaningfully participate in the proceeding as set forth in In re M-A-M-.
Second, for an unrepresented respondent to be competent to represent
herself in an immigration proceeding, she “must also be able to perform
174
additional functions necessary for self-representation.” These functions
include: (1) an ability to exercise the rights listed in In re M-A-M-; (2) the
ability to make informed decisions about whether to waive these rights;
(3) the ability to respond to the allegations and charges in the
proceedings; (4) the ability to present information and evidence relevant
to eligibility for relief; and (5) the ability to act upon instructions and
information presented by the immigration judge and government
175
counsel. Such a standard should be implemented and applied nationwide
in order to ensure the fundamental fairness of removal proceedings.
Indeed, some immigration judges already seem to hold pro se respondents
176
to a different standard, granting some “leeway” in these cases. But
because immigration judges are making competency decisions before
counsel is appointed and without the benefit of a psychiatric evaluation,
respondents are representing themselves pro se in their removal
proceedings, when they are not competent to do so.
3. Without the Benefit of a Comprehensive Psychiatric Evaluation,
Immigration Judges Are Unable to Prescribe Appropriate and
Adequate Safeguards
In In re M-A-M-, the Board articulates a list of nonexhaustive
177
safeguards that an immigration judge may impose when competency is
not established. The decision to impose these safeguards—which ones,
how many, and in what form—is left wholly to the immigration judge. An
immigration judge is not required to receive or consider
recommendations from a mental health professional before arriving at
her decision. Making this determination in a vacuum, without the benefit
of a professional who might be able to suggest safeguards that could, for
example, mitigate a respondent’s delusions, alleviate a respondent’s
paranoia or ensure a respondent’s meaningful participation at trial,
results not only in a failure to protect the respondent’s rights, but also in

174. Id. at *6.
175. Id. at *67.
176. Interview with Immigration Judge (July 16, 2015) (on file with author) (explaining that
“especially for pro se Respondents” this immigration judge will “grant some leeway” and be more
likely to impose safeguards absent an attorney).
177. In re M-A-M-, 25 I. & N. Dec. 474, 483 (B.I.A. 2011) (“Examples of appropriate safeguards
include, but are not limited to, refusal to accept an admission of removability from an unrepresented
respondent; identification and appearance of a family member or close friend who can assist the
respondent and provide the court with information; docketing or managing the case to facilitate the
respondent’s ability to obtain legal representation and/or medical treatment in an effort to restore
competency . . .”).
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challenges, delays and added expense to an already overburdened
178
immigration court system. Regardless of whether they are in consultation
with a mental health professional—and usually they are not—attorneys
have described vastly different experiences with the imposition of
safeguards in removal proceedings. One recurring experience seems to
be an often limited view of what safeguards—or safeguard, singular—are
sufficient. Indeed, some judges across the country are finding that simply
179
appointing counsel is adequate. Other judges, in contrast to the explicit
language of In re M-A-M- stating otherwise, consider the safeguards
180
181
listed therein as exhaustive and inclusive, ruling out other possibilities.
On the other hand, some judges seem open to creative problem solving by
attorneys, allowing a tweaking of legal standards, decreased reliance on
video conferencing and generous continuances to pursue post-conviction
182
relief, among other safeguards.

178. Immigration courts are notoriously overburdened and underfunded. One study revealed that
in 2014, each immigration judge was responsible for an average of 1500 cases annually, and yet a backlog
of approximately 375,500 cases remain unadjudicated. Daniel Costa, Overloaded Immigration Courts,
Econ. Pol’y Inst. (July 24, 2014), http://www.epi.org/publication/immigration-court-caseload-skyrocketing/.
179. Interview with Washington State Immigration Practitioner (May 13, 2015) (on file with
author) (stating plainly, “usually I am the safeguard”); Interview with Pennsylvania Immigration
Practitioner (July 7, 2015) (on file with author) (explaining that the only safeguard he’s seen in his
jurisdiction is an immigration judge reaching out to local pro bono counsel—the interviewee in this
case—and asking that he represent the respondent); Interview with New York Immigration
Practitioner (June 9, 2015) (on file with author) (“I think it’s the safeguard issue that makes judges
really uncomfortable—they’ll say ‘well [the respondent] has you as an attorney . . .’” insinuating that
that is sufficient.); Interview with Massachusetts Immigration Practitioner (May 28, 2015) (on file with
author) (“The [safeguard] that has come up most frequently is . . . counsel.”).
180. Interview with Texas Immigration Practitioner (July 2, 2015) (on file with author) (describing
an immigration judge imposing nine safeguards, each taken verbatim from In re M-A-M-); Interview
with New York Immigration Practitioner (June 9, 2015) (on file with author) (“In the experiences I’ve
had and conversations with colleagues, they really take In re M-A-M- at face value.”). See generally
Interview with Maryland/Virginia Immigration Practitioner (May 21, 2015) (on file with author)
(“[W]e have seen problems with the judges having what we believe to be too narrow of an
understanding of the type of safeguards that should flow from a competency determination.”).
181. See, e.g., Interview with New Jersey Immigration Practitioner (June 10, 2015) (on file with
author) (noting that this attorney’s request that the immigration court appoint a guardian ad litem is
“routinely denied”).
182. Interview with Arizona Immigration Practitioner (June 3, 2015) (on file with author) (noting
that judges have allowed respondents to limit their testimony, allow family members to fill in gaps in
that testimony and to excuse [the respondent] where [she is] disruptive); Interview with New Jersey
Immigration Practitioner (June 10, 2015) (on file with author) (“I’ve asked that testimony be waived
by respondent; that the subjective fear portion of the [asylum] standard be waived, and converted to
an objective [standard]; I’ve asked for physical production of the person—not over VTC [video
teleconferencing].”); Interview with Washington State Immigration Practitioner (May 13, 2015) (on
file with author) (describing generous continuances to pursue post-conviction relief, and U and T visas
before U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services); see also In re J-R-R-A-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 609, 609
(B.I.A. 2015) (finding that where an asylum applicant has competency issues, the immigration judge
should generally accept the applicant’s fear of harm as subjectively genuine based on the applicant’s
perception of the events).
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Of particular note are the vastly differing experiences of respondents
and practitioners who seek termination of removal proceedings when no
safeguards are sufficient to protect the rights of their mentally ill and
incompetent clients. In criminal court cases, judges have the authority to
dismiss a case where a criminal defendant is not likely to become
183
competent. In Jackson v. Indiana the Supreme Court held that a
criminal defendant’s due process is violated where the individual “is
committed solely on account of his incapacity to proceed to trial” and
held that such defendant “cannot be held more than the reasonable period
of time necessary to determine whether there is a substantial probability
184
that he will attain that capacity in the foreseeable future.” In In re MA-M-, the Board lists only administrative closure, and not termination—
the immigration removal proceeding analogue to dismissal—as a possible
option. While administrative closure—removing the case from the docket,
albeit temporarily—can be a positive outcome for some respondents, it
185
does not ensure release from detention for a detained respondent, and
186
indeed can leave a respondent vulnerable and in limbo indefinitely. At
the same time, the EOIR Immigration Judge Benchbook (“EOIR
Benchbook”), a nonbinding resource created by EOIR to provide
substantive and procedural guidance for immigration judges, does offer
that termination can be appropriate for those noncitizens found to be
187
mentally incompetent, and for whom no other safeguards are sufficient.
188
But as DHS Counsel and immigration judges alike have argued, the
EOIR Benchbook is not binding legal authority and the Board has yet to
issue a precedential decision upholding a case where proceedings were
terminated based on the theory that the respondent was so incompetent
as to render the proceedings unfair.
The result of an omission in the case law and a lack of clear statutory
or regulatory guidance is that immigration judges have really varied in
their willingness to terminate an incompetent respondent’s removal
proceedings. For example, some immigration judges believe they have no

183. 406 U.S. 715 (1972).
184. Id. at 738.
185. Interview with Arizona Immigration Practitioner (June 3, 2015) (on file with author)
(explaining that, in the past, DHS would often agree to release a mentally ill detainee upon
administrative closure, but that they are increasingly resistant to this idea); Interview with Immigration
Judge (July 16, 2015) (on file with author) (explaining that he has only agreed to administrative
closure where the detained respondent was being released to a state mental hospital).
186. Interview with New Jersey Immigration Practitioner (June 10, 2015) (on file with author)
(describing a case in which though the respondent was released to a psychiatric facility upon
administrative closure by the immigration court, DHS has expressed a strong inclination to re-charge
the respondent and place him, anew, in immigration removal proceedings).
187. Explaining that termination may be appropriate “where respondents are unable to proceed in
light of mental health issues and a corresponding inability to secure adequate safeguards, as required
by Section 240(b)(3) of the Act.” Immigration Judge Benchbook, supra note 5.
188. Decision and Order of the Immigration Judge (Apr. 6, 2015) (on file with author).
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189

authority to order termination or that they can only order termination
190
with the consent of DHS counsel. Meanwhile, immigration judges in
other jurisdictions are routinely ordering termination for incompetent
191
192
respondents that appear before them. Others, notably Fatma Marouf,
have written persuasively that termination can and should be a viable
option and have made suggestions as to how and where the regulations can
be amended in this regard.
In sum, the increased role of immigration judges, in lieu of meaningful
consideration of the evaluation and testimony of mental health
professionals, has significantly compromised the rights and protections
afforded to mentally ill and incompetent respondents in removal
proceedings.
III. The Role of the Immigration Judge in Removal Proceedings
Should Be Deemphasized in Favor of an Increased Role for Mental
Health Professionals
In order to ensure that the rights of mentally ill and incompetent
respondents in removal proceedings are adequately protected and to
ensure fundamental fairness, this Article proposes that the role of the
immigration judge should be deemphasized in favor of an increased role
for mental health professionals, similar to the procedures in place in
criminal proceedings.
The suggestion that mental health professionals, in lieu of
immigration judges, must be central to the competency evaluation process,
is a novel one in immigration removal proceedings. Building on the
insightful, much needed, and thought provoking recommendations of
other scholars, this Part argues that in light of the procedures and
protections in place in the criminal justice system, and in consideration of
the present experiences of removal defense practitioners across the country,
the role of certified or licensed mental health professionals must be primary,
and their presence must come earlier in the proceeding.

189. Decision of Immigration Judge (Apr. 6, 2015) (on file with author) (immigration judge
arguing that he is “not vested with the legal authority” to order termination and citing to 8 C.F.R.
§§ 1239.2(f), 1238.1(e), 1239.2(c) (2015)); In re G-N-C-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 281, 284 (B.I.A. 1998); see also
Interview with New York Immigration Practitioner (June 9, 2015) (on file with author) (“I haven’t
heard of a case yet where [the Immigration] Judge has agreed to terminate.”).
190. Interview with Immigration Judge (July 16, 2015) (on file with author) (explaining that he has
only agreed to termination or administrative closure with the agreement of the DHS and has been
“reluctant” to take such action “unilaterally”).
191. Interview with New Jersey Immigration Practitioner (June 10, 2015) (on file with author)
(explaining that she has represented approximately fifteen respondents annually with competency
evaluations each year for the last four years and had approximately ten to fifteen cases terminated on
competency grounds).
192. Marouf, supra note 12.
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A. The Test for Determining Whether a Mental Competency
Evaluation Is Necessary Should Be Amended
Presently, pursuant to In re M-A-M- and the Phase I guidance
announced in 2013, an immigration judge—and an immigration judge
alone—undertakes three separate stages of inquiry in order to determine
the competency of a respondent. The stages include: (1) detecting indicia
of incompetency; (2) conducting a judicial inquiry; and (3) conducting a
193
competency review. While an immigration judge may consider “health
examinations” during the first two stages, such consideration is not
required and indeed, will not always be available. It is only during the third
stage—after an immigration judge has detected indicia of incompetency
and conducted a thorough judicial inquiry, in which it is suggested that an
immigration judge provide “advisals” and conduct a direct examination
194
including nearly fifty substantive questions —that an immigration judge
may “consider” whether to refer the respondent for a mental health
195
examination to help inform the court’s decision making. This kind of
protracted inquiry—which proceeds, in three separate stages absent any
guarantee of the outside voice of a mental health professional—is
insufficient to protect the fundamental fairness of the proceeding and the
rights of mentally ill and incompetent respondents.
This Article proposes a new test for determining when a mental
health examination should be performed. In order to protect the
fundamental fairness of the proceeding and the rights of mentally ill and
incompetent respondents, removal proceedings should operate more like
criminal proceedings. As explained above, the bar in criminal proceedings
for a mental health examination by a certified or licensed mental health
professional is relatively low. There is no three-tiered inquiry by a
criminal court judge and “evidence of a defendant’s irrational behavior,
his demeanor at trial, and any prior medical opinion on competence to
stand trial are all relevant in determining whether further inquiry is
required,” and “even one of these factors standing alone may, in some
196
circumstances, be sufficient.” The standard in immigration removal
proceedings should be similarly modest. Where a respondent is detained,
indigent, and determined with indicia of incompetency by an immigration
judge, a mental health examination should be immediately performed.
Other scholars have written extensively about the “cascading
constitutional deprivations” for criminal defendants and respondents in
removal proceedings when counsel is not provided in the early stages of a

193.
194.
195.
196.

Exec. Office for Immigration Review, supra note 127, at 3.
Id. at Appendix A.
Id.
See Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 180 (1975).
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197

trial proceeding. So too in this context will a respondent in removal
proceedings face cascading deprivation if a mental health examination,
by a mental health professional—rather than an immigration judge—is
not performed early in the proceedings. Two recent cases at the Board of
Immigration AppealsIn re J-R-R-A and In re G-G-S-reveal why
forgoing a mental competency evaluation early in the proceeding lead to
this kind of “cascading constitutional deprivation.” It is disastrous to
both the respondent and the integrity of the proceeding itself. In In re
198
J-R-R-A, an immigration judge found a respondent to be competent to
proceed—but then it was the respondent’s very mental illness that led
199
the immigration judge to an unfavorable credibility finding. On appeal,
the Board instructed the immigration judge to consider the respondent’s
mental illness in making a credibility determination. Specifically, the
Board held that the immigration judge should accept the respondent’s
fear of harm as subjectively genuine based on the applicant’s perception
200
of the events, despite it seeming otherwise not credible.
201
By comparison, in In re G-G-S-, the Board considered the case of
a respondent suffering from chronic paranoid schizophrenia. The
respondent was convicted of assault with a deadly weapon and the
immigration judge found that he had been convicted of an aggravated
202
felony. The immigration judge also found the respondent incompetent
and several procedural safeguards were implemented, including the
provision of legal counsel, appearance by the respondent’s mother on his
behalf and the release of the respondent from custody. The immigration
judge then held that the respondent was ineligible for withholding of
removal because he had been convicted of a “particularly serious crime,”
203
the determination of which is a factual inquiry. On appeal, the
respondent argued that his mental illness at the time of his offense
should be a factor in determining whether his offense was a particularly
serious crime. The Board disagreed, holding that mental illness is a
consideration to be left to the criminal courts and cannot be considered in
the determination whether an offense is particularly serious under
204
Section 241(b)(3)(B) of INA. In sum, two Board of Immigration
Appeals’ decisions, within a year of one another, arrived at divergent
conclusions, holding that the immigration judge should or, in the latter
case, absolutely should not, consider the mental illness of the respondent.
197. See Mark Noferi, Cascading Constitutional Deprivation: The Right to Appointed Counsel for
Mandatorily Detained Immigrants Pending Removal Proceedings, 18 Mich. J. Race & L. 63 (2012).
198. In re J-R-R-A, 26 I. & N. Dec. 609 (B.I.A. 2015).
199. Id. at 612.
200. Id. at 609.
201. In re G-G-S-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 339, 340 (B.I.A. 2014).
202. INA § 101(a)(43)(F), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(F) (2016).
203. In re G-G-S-, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 348.
204. Id. at 347.
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The juxtaposition of these two cases is instructive, and if the
recommendations of this Article were put into place—namely an early
mental health evaluation by a mental health professional—the Board might
be spared the need to grapple with these kinds of considerations, saving
both time and money.
B. The Potential Concerns of Relying on Mental Health Experts
Can Be Avoided
As with all change, increased reliance on the opinion and evaluation
of mental health experts could pose risks and challenges for immigration
courts. Concerns about cost and bias in the criminal justice system are of
equal concern in the removal defense context where expense is a central
part of every conversation and impartiality carries important weight. But
will an increased, early reliance on the opinion and evaluation of mental
health experts actually add cost or introduce bias as some might fear?
First, is the issue of cost. Because removal proceedings are supposed
205
to be “streamlined,” concerns about additional costs—in both time and
money—are frequently central to conversations about increasing rights
and protections for all respondents in removal proceedings.
But any consideration of cost must take into account the basis for
comparison. Presently, ICE’s annual budget for immigration detention is
about $2 billion. The daily cost of detention is about $164 per person.
With 34,000 detainees on any given day, the costs rapidly add up. Today,
the federal government spends more than $5 million a day to detain
206
noncitizens in the United States.
In the context of these astronomical expenses, the three stages of
inquiry required by In re M-A-M- and the Phase I Plan are cumbersome
and inefficient, requiring an immigration judge to often hold multiple
hearings with a respondent who may be unable to effectively communicate
or relay basic information about her life and any claims for relief. Most
importantly, even these three stages of inquiry may still lead, ultimately,
to referral for a mental health examination and potentially, to appointment
of counsel. Just as studies have demonstrated that appointment of counsel
earlier in the process can expedite proceedings and shorten the length of
207
detention and costs incurred by DHS, a mental health examination
205. See Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1038–39 (1984)
(“[A] deportation hearing is intended to provide a streamlined determination of eligibility to remain in
this country, nothing more.”).
206. Human Rights First, Immigration Detention: How Can the Government Cut Costs?
(2013).
207. New York Immigrant Representation, Accessing Justice II: A Model for Providing
Counsel to New York Immigrants in Removal Proceedings 21 (2012) (explaining how a public
defender model of deportation defense will “increase efficiency and fairness in the entire adjudication
process”); see also Ingrid V. Eagly & Steven Shafer, A National Study of Access to Counsel in
Immigration Court, 164 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1, 62 (2015).
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early on would assist immigration judges and Courts to facilitate speedier
proceedings and diminish the costs associated with prolonged detention
and litigation. Further, it would be difficult to argue that the immigration
208
courts—which are notoriously backlogged —would not benefit from
209
more focused and efficient proceedings. Allowing telephonic, rather
than in-court, testimony by mental health professionals could further
reduce the cost of mental health examinations. While in-person
testimony is always preferable, telephonic testimony is permissible and
210
routinely utilized for other witnesses testifying in removal proceedings.
A second concern of reliance on the testimony of mental health
professionals is potential mental health examiner bias. The mental health
211
professional may introduce bias and an adjudicator may favor the
212
evaluation done by one side over the other.
Currently, in jurisdictions where the Franco-Gonzalez order is in
force, the DHS will often submit a short evaluation completed by staff
employed by either ICE or by the jail in which the respondent is being
detained. At least anecdotally, immigration judges rely heavily on these
213
evaluations in making initial competency determinations. This is a
moment in the proceedings where counsel has not yet been appointed
and which, in Franco-Gonzalez jurisdictions and elsewhere, could be
outcome determinative. If a judge finds that the respondent is competent,
in reliance on this evaluation, typically no counsel will be appointed.
Where Franco-Gonzalez controls, there are orders in place that
pertain to mental health evaluations both at the initial point of detention
214
and later, at the order of an immigration judge. When ordered by an
208. The average length of a pending case in removal proceedings in FY 2015 (up through June 2015)
is 619 days nationwide. Immigration Court Backlog Tool, TRAC Immigr., http://trac.syr.edu/
phptools/immigration/court_backlog/ (last visited Apr. 8, 2016). This is an increase from 455 days in
2012. See Noferi, supra note 197, at 81.
209. See Lenni B. Benson & Russell R. Wheeler, Enhancing Quality and Timeliness in
Immigration Removal Adjudication 12–17, 22–31 (2012) (describing immigration court backlogs).
210. “In certain instances, witnesses may testify by telephone, at the Immigration Judge’s
discretion.” Exec. Office of Immigration Review, Immigration Court Practice Manual 81 (2016).
211. Indeed, recent studies have shown that there may be some evidence of the “allegiance effect,”
that is that experts hired by either side—defense or prosecution—may be impaired in their ability to
handle cases objectively. See, e.g., Daniel C. Murrie et al., Ass’n for Psychological Sci., Are
Forensic Experts Biased by the Side That Retained Them? (2013).
212. See, e.g., Interview with Washington State Immigration Practitioner (May 13, 2015) (on file
with author) (explaining that in his jurisdiction, which is covered by Franco-Gonzalez, “judges give
more weight to [evaluations done by the government] . . . they rely heavily on the ICE mental health
evaluations”).
213. See id.; see also Interview with Arizona Immigration Practitioner (June 3, 2015) (on file with
author) (“[I]n terms of competency evaluations, I think they should be finding more people to be
incompetent.”). But see Interview with New Jersey Immigration Practitioner (June 10, 2015) (on file
with author) (explaining that not only does ICE not submit an in-custody evaluation, but that they
typically do not submit anything at all).
214. Franco-Gonzalez v. Holder, No. CV-10-02211 DMG (DBTx), 2014 WL 5475097 (C.D. Cal.
Oct. 29, 2014).
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immigration judge, they include both “Judicial Competency Inquiries”
and “Forensic Competency Evaluations” which are required to be
conducted by mental health professionals, the latter “substantially in
accordance with the procedures described in the American Academy of
Psychiatry and the Law Practice Guideline for the Forensic Evaluation of
215
Competence to Stand Trial.” In contrast, in jurisdictions where the
Franco-Gonzalez order is not in place, no practitioners interviewed have
reported the use of an independent psychological evaluation ordered by
216
an immigration judge. While the ability of an immigration judge to
order such evaluation is laid out in the Phase I Plan, it remains more of a
promise than a practice in most, if not all, jurisdictions. In the meantime,
like the attorneys in Jonathan’s case, immigration removal defense
practitioners are on the hook to either pay for a psychological evaluation
217
or secure one pro bono. This is not an easy task.
But again, while still imperfect, the criminal justice system can
provide some guidance on how to guard against bias, while also
acknowledging that absolute objectivity is nearly impossible. Practices
vary by state, but all jurisdictions have a mechanism that allows the
criminal court to obtain an evaluation to determine a defendant’s
218
competence to stand trial. In Massachusetts for example, a defendant
with questionable mental competency might first be referred to a “court
clinician” for an initial competency screening. Such screening could take
place at arraignment, inside the court itself. For a more determinative
competency evaluation, each side may hire—or request funds from the
court to hire—an evaluator to conduct an examination and provide
written and oral testimony to the court. Similarly, in the immigration
removal context, and as suggested in the Phase I Plan, EOIR can order
an evaluation by a mental health professional that has undergone specific
219
training for evaluation in an immigration court setting. How evaluators
are selected, the criteria used, and the training they are provided, are all
areas ripe for debate—and contentious decisions not addressed by this
Article. In the end, however, while there are challenges inherent in any
of these scenarios, an initial screening by an evaluator employed not by

215. Id. at *9.
216. See, e.g., Question: “Have you had any cases in which a mental health expert has been
appointed at the court’s expense?” Eight out of eight practitioners operating in non-Franco-Gonzalez
sites responded “no” to this question. Although practitioners did say that it “sounds great” and were
hoping such practices would be implemented in their jurisdictions soon.
217. See, e.g., Interview with Texas Immigration Practitioner (July 2, 2015) (on file with author)
(explaining that because of a lack of available pro bono evaluators in her non-Franco-Gonzalez
jurisdiction, attorneys are relying on New York City forensic examiners available to do evaluations by
Skype).
218. William H. Fisher et al., From Case Management to Court Clinic: Examining Forensic System
Involvement of Persons with Severe Mental Illness, 2 Mental Health Serv. Res. 41, 49 (2000).
219. Exec. Office for Immigration Review, supra note 127, at 8–10.
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either side but by the immigration court may go a long way toward
220
establishing some objectivity.
After the question of who conducts the evaluation is resolved, there
may also be concerns about process and procedure. Here, the FrancoGonzalez litigation can be instructive. As the order in Franco-Gonzalez
suggests, those in the immigration system can also turn to the American
Academy of Psychiatry and the Law Practice Guideline for the Forensic
Evaluation of Competency to Stand Trial for a thorough summary of best
practices in evaluation, including sections devoted to ethics, objectivity
221
and confidentiality.
C. Alternative Solutions Are Insufficient to Protect the Rights of
Incompetent Respondents in Removal Proceedings
Few would argue that In re M-A-M- and the developments that have
followed are not welcome additions to the protections afforded to mentally
ill and mentally incompetent respondents in removal proceedings. Still,
there remain outstanding challenges to protecting the rights of respondents
and the fundamental fairness of removal proceedings. While this Article
contends that the best next step is to emphasize the role of a mental
health professional in the initial competency determination, over the
singular determination of an immigration judge, there are other
approaches that could also yield positive results. This Article argues,
however, that these alternatives, while beneficial, are insufficient when
standing alone.
One ready solution—or potential solution—to the criticisms voiced
above, could be to make changes to the regulations requiring that
counsel be appointed before a competency determination is made.
222
Indeed, other scholars have made this very suggestion. One could
argue that only in this way could immigration judges be sure that a
respondent’s ability to consult with an attorney is meaningful and
substantive, as Dusky requires. While this shift in standard would surely
be meaningful for many respondents, it would not change the role of the

220. However, so-called “Lamb Warnings” in Massachusetts requiring that a clinician advise a
patient prior to a forensic evaluation that,
the individual’s participation is voluntary and may be terminated at any time, and that any
communications made during the course of the evaluation will not be privileged and may be
disclosed in court proceedings. A Lamb Warning is only valid if the individual knowingly
and voluntarily agrees to waive the privilege upon receiving such notification.
Mass. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., DMH Policy No. 1401 2 (2015); see Commonwealth v.
Lamb, 311 N.E.2d 47 (Mass. 1974).
221. Douglas Mossman et al., AAPL Practice Guideline for the Forensic Psychiatric Evaluation of
Competence to Stand Trial, 35 J. Am. Acad. Psychiatry & L. S3 (2007).
222. Amelia Wilson et al., Addressing All Heads of the Hydra: Reframing Safeguards for Mentally
Impaired Detainees in Immigration Removal Proceedings, 39 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change 313
(2015).
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immigration judge as central to the competency determination. This shift
in standard would not require the evaluation or testimony of a mental
health professional or that such mental health professional be consulted
prior to an immigration judge’s determination of competency. In practice
then, while this change might lead to appointed defense counsel seeking
out her own psychological evaluation, such evaluation would be
discretionary, and not required. Indeed, in areas where pro bono services
could not be secured or where defense counsel was otherwise unable to
retain an evaluator, the result would be the same: an immigration judge
alone would make any initial competency determination.
Another possible change that might positively impact the
representation and rights of mentally ill and incompetent respondents is
to create a separate, pro se competency standard akin to that in Edwards.
As noted above, a pro se competency standard in removal proceedings is
not without precedent. In fact, such a standard is part of the order
223
further implementing Franco-Gonzalez and provides a significant
improvement in protecting the rights of mentally ill and incompetent
respondents. Like in Edwards, a pro se competency standard in removal
proceedings ensures that respondents are being assessed not only on
their competence to proceed, but on their competence to proceed
without counsel—and to perform all the necessary functions required in
an individual, and highly complex, removal hearing. While this fix has
224
been proposed by other scholars, and would no doubt provide increased
protections for noncitizen respondents, it is not alone an adequate remedy
because it again leaves the initial competency determination to an
immigration judge who, often in a vacuum, makes a determination that
could be outcome dependent.
Finally, if the contention is that immigration judges are currently ill
equipped to make competency determinations, one immediate remedy
might be to simply provide them with more thorough training on mental
competency and mental health issues. Practitioners certainly would be in
225
favor of such action. Indeed, the Immigration Judge Benchbook has, in
recent years, attempted to provide additional guidance to immigration
judges. The latest version of the Benchbook includes a summary of the
current legal framework and suggested readings, including Dusky and
Edwards, as well as resources from the American Academy of Psychiatry
223. Franco-Gonzalez v. Holder, No. CV-10-02211 DMG (DTBx), 2014 WL 5475097 (C.D. Cal.
Oct. 29, 2014).
224. Marouf, supra note 12.
225. See, e.g., Interview with Maryland/Virginia Immigration Practitioner (May 21, 2015) (on file
with author) (lamenting that in her non-Franco-Gonzalez jurisdiction, “[there] hasn’t been sufficient
training on even basic things like what are indicia and different types of illnesses that might be
appearing in front of them in addition to a lack of training about what the legal standard is and what
legal safeguards it’s appropriate for them to be using once [a] competency determination has been
made”).
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226

and Law. But immigration judges are exceedingly busy and short on
time. While the average federal district judge has a pending caseload of
400 cases and three law clerks to assist, in FY 2009, immigration judges
completed over 1500 cases per judge on average, with a ratio of one law
227
clerk for every four judges. And even with the most robust support and
training, asking immigration judges to make competency determinations
without the benefit of a competency evaluation would be asking them to
perform a task that we have never asked of criminal court judges.
Conclusion
A respondent who stands “helpless and alone before the Court” can
228
have no fair trial at all. And for respondents facing deportation from
the United States, once there is any doubt about their competency, a
mental health professional must conduct an evaluation before an
immigration judge can render a decision as to competency. Immigration
courts have made significant strides in recent years when it comes to the
rights and protections afforded to the mentally ill and incompetent, but
there remains significant work to be done. Fortunately, immigration
judges and practitioners have the benefit of the lessons learned over
more than sixty years of mental competency jurisprudence in the
criminal justice context. Because immigration removal proceedings share
the adversarial nature and high stakes, if not always the substantive and
procedural protections present in the criminal context, it is instructive to
draw on successes and challenges of mental competency determinations
in the criminal justice context. In so doing, it is clear that the role of
immigration judges in competency determinations should be deemphasized
in favor of an increasingly prominent, and early, role for mental health
professionals. Alternate solutions—including earlier provision of counsel,
a pro se competency standard and increased training for immigration
judges—are necessary but insufficient to ensure fundamental fairness for
mentally ill and incompetent respondents in removal proceedings.
Involvement by qualified mental health professionals once doubts about
competency surface is the only way to protect the rights of these most
vulnerable respondents, while also building toward an increasingly efficient
removal process.

226. Immigration Judge Benchbook, supra note 5.
227. Oversight Hearing, supra note 96.
228. Massey v. Moore, 348 U.S. 105, 108 (1954).
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